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Abstract
Today’s networks face continuously arising new threats, making analysis of network data
for the detection of anomalies in current operational networks essential. Network operators
have to deal with the analysis of huge volumes of data. To counter this main issue, dealing
with IP flows (also known as Netflows) records is common in network management. However
in modern networks, even Netflow records still represent a high volume of data. Interest
in traffic classification as well as attack and anomaly detection in network monitoring and
security related activities has become very strong.
This thesis addresses the topic of Netflow record analysis by introducing simple mecha-
nisms for the evaluation of large quantities of data. The mechanisms are based on spatially
aggregated Netflow records. These records are evaluated by the use of a kernel function.
This similarity function analyses aggregated data on quantitative and topological pattern
changes. By the use of machine learning techniques the aim is to use the aggregated data
and classify it into benign traffic and anomalies. Besides the detection of anomalies in net-
work traffic, traffic is analyzed from the perspective of an attacker and a network operator
by using a game-theoretical model in order to define strategies for attack and defence.
To extend the evaluation models, information from the application layer has been an-
alyzed. An occurring problem with application flows is that in some cases, network flows
cannot be clearly attributed to sessions or users, as for example in anonymous overlay net-
works. A model for the attribution of flows to sessions or users has been defined and related
to this, the behaviour of attack and defence mechanisms is studied in the framework of a
game.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A global picture
Do you know what happens on the Internet in 60 seconds? Or have you ever asked the
question, how many emails are sent in 60 seconds or even, how many voice calls are made
in 60 seconds? To be honest, I did not know and therefore,...I googled... with the result
that I finally found a web-blog [15] with an article covering exactly this topic and providing
some facts about the daily use of the World-Wide-Web (represented in Figure 1.1). In that
moment, I recognized that my search query on Google was one out of 694,445 made every
60 seconds....This set me thinking.
Figure 1.1: 60 Seconds - Things that happen on Internet every 60 seconds [15]
With the ever- increasing popularity of the Internet, a direct consequence is the increasing
amount of content and traffic. Looking at Figure 1.1, it can be seen that 168 million emails
are sent every 60 seconds, more than 70 new domains are registered and 370,000 voice calls
1
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are made with Skype1. In a recent white paper by Cisco [106], the claim is made that by
end of 2015, global IP traffic will reach one zettabyte per year and break the threshold of
three billion Internet users. This increase is due to the growing connectivity in developing
countries and also the increase of mobile devices using the Web. This means in Western
Europe, in 2015, IP traffic will probably reach 19 exabytes per month, which represents
around 32% of the global annual compound rate (GACR). Figure 1.2 by Cisco [106], shows
an estimate of the evolution of traffic load from 1995 to 2015.
 
 
© 2011 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is Cisco Public Information. Page 7 of 16 
Figure 3.   The VNI Forecast Within Historical Context 
 
Most IP traffic growth results from growth in Internet traffic, compared to managed IP traffic. Of the 80.5 total 
exabytes, 60 are due to fixed Internet and 6 are due to mobile Internet. Fixed and mobile Internet traffic, in turn, 
are propelled by video. 
Figure 4.   Cisco VNI Global IP Traffic Forecast 
 
As in previous forecasts, the sum of all forms of IP video (Internet video, IP VoD, video files exchanged through 
file sharing, video-streamed gaming, and video conferencing) will ultimately reach 90 percent of total IP traffic. 
Taking a more narrow definition of Internet video that excludes file sharing and gaming, Internet video will account 
for 61 percent of consumer Internet traffic in 2015 (Figure 5). 
Figure 1.2: Estimate of traffic load until 2015 by Cisco [106]
This can be explained by the rapid increase in bandwidth over the last years. In the
90’s most private Internet users had slow Internet connections (28.8/33.6/56 kbps modems)
whereas nowadays a connection of 2-10 Mbits/s is quite common. The same is true for con-
tent: for example in 1995 the main activity was email and most people restricted their emails
to simple text and low-bit images in order to keep email size below 1 Mbyte. Today, with
high bandwidth connections, content has changed; common activities are social networking2,
Peer-to-Peer transmission, video and sound transmission for example with YouTube3 and
similar services.
This increase of Internet traffic also requires more traffic control on the network archi-
tecture operation side, because harmful traffic and attacks will increase as well. A recent
example is the attacks launched against Sony’s PlayStation Network4. A statement from
Sony on the Forbes’ Website5 states that the overall costs for the attacks in April 2011 are
more than $170M.
From a quantitative perspective, the 2010 Kaspersky Security Bulletin [75] states that
they observed about 580 millions attacks on the Internet. These attacks were originated in
different countries, but most malware detected by Kaspersky originated from 20 countries,
for example the USA or China. A similar situation can be observed for spam and phishing
emails. In a monthly report [129] from Symantec it is claimed that about 74% of the emails
from September 2011 were spam, whereas only one in 188 emails contained malware.
1http://www.skype.com/
2examples: http://www.facebook.com,http://twitter.com,http://www.linkedin.com/
3http://www.youtube.com
4http://lu.playstation.com/psn/news/
5http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/05/23/sony-pegs-psn-attack-costs-at-170-million
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Figure 1: Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge11 
Figure 2 illustrates the vulnerability exploit cycle, in which the height of the graph represents the 
number of security incidents related to a given vulnerability. In the beginning, a sophisticated at-
tacker discovers a new vulnerability, and a few systems are compromised in an early attempt to 
exploit the vulnerability. Eventually, the widespread availability of exploit tools leads to a peak in 
the number of incidents. The release of security advisories and the availability of vendor patches 
help to finally reduce the number of incidents related to the vulnerability. 
                                                 
11
 Source: CERT Coordination Center, © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University. 
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Figure 1.3: Trend of technical intruder knowledge vs. attack complexity [79]
Besides these threats, a recent study from Eurostat [41] showed that in 2010 in the Euro-
pean Union, nearly 60% of private users used security software to protect their equipment,
but 55% of the individuals questioned also indicated that they only update their security
products occasionally.
Besides the aspect on the quantity of attacks, their complexity and impact also increased.
For example in Figure 1.3 from 2002 by [79], the complexity trend for attacks for the last 20
years is represented. I can be observed that due to the availability on the Internet of “off
the shelf” attacks, an attack can be performed with two clicks nowadays. This shows that
deep technical and programming knowledge is no longer really necessary to play the hacker.
Such attackers are known as script-kiddies. Of course, highly sophisticated attacks and new
attacks still demand technical knowledge from an intruder; for example to write new codes
or 0-day exploits.
These arguments show that the need for strong monitoring tools network architectures
is becoming indispensable, now and in the future, in order to reinforce the security of users,
to minimize the impact of attacks and to neutralize possible threats in advance. Due to the
large quantities of network data available, a realistic approach to monitoring is to use IP
flow records. This kind of data provides useful information about communicating partners
(who with whom), the quantity (how many) and additionally provides information about
the type of exchanged data (what). For monitoring at the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
level this provides a good solution due to its compact format. A formal definition of IP flow
records is provided in section 2.1. The terms IP flow record and Netflow record will be used
interchangeably for the rest of this document.
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1.2 Problem statement and methodology
The aim of this thesis is to introduce simple mechanisms for the analysis of Netflow records
in order to detect anomalies or attacks by combining a simple distance function with ma-
chine learning approaches. Over recent years, the domain of network monitoring became
a popular research area in both academia and industry. Some of the landmark papers in
this research area are, [129, 75, 76, 70, 86, 73, 7, 160, 33, 50, 97, 140], but with perma-
nently increasing workloads and newly arising network threats, interest in further research
in this domain remains. The information captured on the wire not only provides insights
into the world of technical issues like machine crashes, but also provides precious informa-
tion about anomalies, for example Denial-of-Service attacks, worms, etc. Huge quantities of
such data are generated at the ISP level. These huge quantities of data should be analyzed
and evaluated by introducing new evaluation metrics extracted from Netflow records for the
generation of a new distance function. An initial research question is,
• What metrics can be extracted from IP flow record information in order to define a
new distance function that is able to capture changes in patterns of traffic?
This research question deals with the analysis of Netflow record data in order to identify
useful metrics, which can be extracted and used for the definition of a distance function, also
known as a kernel function. The aim of this kernel function is to capture changes in traffic
information in two different ways. In a first instance significant quantitative changes should
be recognized and second, topological changes in traffic should be detected. Additionally,
this function is defined to represent traffic information as an additional metric that can be
applied to machine learning for the purpose of classification. For classification, different
algorithms are evaluated in order to identify the most appropriate for the kernel function.
To validate the approach, experiments are performed Netflow record time series are applied
to the defined kernel function and subsequently evaluated using a variety of classification
algorithms.
A limitation of the previous approach is that the analysis of a time series that includes all
monitored Netflow records for a time period, is a tedious and complex task, as the storage of
all Netflow records is nearly impossible, since peak rates of 60,000 flows/second at the ISP
level are quite common. Therefore the previous research question is extended in order that
a summarized form of Netflow records can be analyzed to reduce the storage problem. After
studying different compression/summarization techniques for Netflow records, a decision was
made to use tree-like aggregation of IP flow data together with a corresponding reformulation
of the kernel function. Therefore, the second research question is
• How to detect anomalies and attacks in spatially and temporally aggregated IP flow
information?
This second research question addresses the topic of detecting anomalies in aggregated Net-
flow records by reformulating the kernel function such that it is able to deal with spatially
and temporally aggregated Netflow records. In this tree-like aggregation process small IP
flow records are aggregated into larger ones. This provides traffic profiles for a given time
period. In order to catch changes in the traffic profiles, the kernel function has to be adapted
and reformulated to extract useful metrics. To validate these modifications, time series of
traffic profiles are evaluated by the kernel function and machine learning algorithms and
additionally a mechanism to reconstruct sparse or lost traffic time periods is modelled.
From a network operator or attacker perspective it is interesting to know which kind
of defensive measure or, respectively, attack to choose, such that the result of the action is
optimal. A game-theoretical model is introduced in order to study the behaviour of different
strategies for attacking/defending a network architecture.
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The research question that arises is,
• Which attack and defence strategy performs the best with the analysis of Netflow
records?
This research question deals with the evaluation of different attack and defence strategies
in a network by applying aggregated Netflow records and the kernel function to a game-
theoretical model. Different strategies for an attacker and for the network operator are
identified and evaluated by applying a game-theoretical model called Nash Equilibrium.
Different kinds of flows exist in a network. To extend the evaluation of flows, application
layer flows are analyzed. The problem with application flows is that in some cases, flows
cannot be attributed to users or sessions, as for example in anonymous overlay networks,
for example Tor [133]. This last research question deals with the topic of,
• How may IP flow information from the application layer be attributed to a user or
session?
This research question addresses the topic of analyzing anonymous network flows in order to
reconstruct sessions by controlling an exit node, so allowing evaluated flows to be attributed
to users. For this approach a semi-supervised learning algorithm is introduced. To enhance
the model, a game-theoretical framework is modelled to study the behaviour of attacker and
defender strategies such that the optimal strategies for both parties can be identified.
1.3 Contributions and thesis outline
The structure of this thesis follows the order of the main research questions and is represented
in outline form in Figure 1.4. It is divided into two parts, State of the art and contributions.
The first part, State of the art, includes relevant work done in the area of network moni-
toring and while dealing with Netflow records, different kinds of threats have to be managed.
Therefore, it is considered relevant to regroup the state of the art part for the analysis of IP
flow records into different chapters. These chapters are organized by considering different
aspects related to IP flow records. The state of the art is structured as follows:
- Chapter 2 gives an introduction to Netflow records and describes the research domain
of Netflow records and anomaly detection.
- Chapter 3 presents relevant research work done for the capture and storage of IP
flow/packet information. This chapter is divided into four sections, the first section
describes recent sampling and aggregation methods for IP flow/packet information.
The second section discusses approaches for the storage of network data. The third
section highlights relevant work for the detection of dependencies between flows and
applications. The fourth section presents state of the art work performed in the area
of anomaly detection for IP flow records while using machine learning approaches.
The second part, Contributions, focuses on the several research contributions that are made
by this thesis. The Contribution part is divided into two parts, A and B, which deal with
two kinds of network information: Part A covers the Netflow record data from an ISP that
has been used as a basis for the main contributions (chapters 4 to 7), while Part B uses Tor
data for the evaluation of the attribution of flows to users or sessions (Chapters 8 and 9).
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Part A:
- Chapter 4 presents the analysis of Netflow records from a large-scale network. This
chapter contributes a new approach for analyzing large volumes of IP ow-related data
by defining a kernel function that is able to track topological and quantitative changes
in traffic. The objective is to detect traffic anomalies and to characterize network
traffic by applying machine learning.
- Chapter 5 presents an aggregation technique that preserves topological and quan-
titative changes in a network without losing much data. To evaluate the aggregated
data, the kernel function for Netflow records is reformulated to be applicable to the
new data format.
- Chapter 6 presents a game-theroretical model to identify the best strategy mainly
from the perspective of an attacker having complete knowledge about the defence
system, but also from the perspective of a network operator.
- Chapter 7 deals with the topic of sparse data or lacks of data series in time series.
This has an effect on the evaluation of the traffic time series. In this chapter, the
main contribution is a new model that uses an accurate method for the embedding
of time series into a n-dimensional space such that missing dimensions in aggregated
traffic profiles can be reconstructed and evaluated by applying a classifier in order to
separate attacks from benign traffic.
Part B:
- Chapter 8 presents a new model for the reconstruction of Tor sessions by applying
a semi-supervised learning algorithm. A new attack model is presented that leverages
a data mining technique together with aspects of the HTTP protocol (as only Web
traffic is considered) to cluster and extract individual HTTP sessions relayed over a
malicious exit node.
- Chapter 9 contributes an efficient game-theoretical model that on one hand deals
with user privacy by presenting a variety of defensive measures and, on the other,
presents attack strategies for the attacker to remain undetected such that a maximum
number of sessions can be reconstructed.
- The Conclusions and Future Work chapter concludes the thesis and presents pos-
sible future work.
- The Appendix provides information about the data sets and tools used for the ex-
periments , as well as information that was not considered as scientific contributions
per se. An example is the implemented prototype, PeekKernelFlows, a vizualization
tool for the evaluation of kernel function results.
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Figure 1.4: Thesis structure
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Chapter 2
Introduction
State of the art in Netflow monitoring
The monitoring of network architectures and observation of network activities is highly im-
portant. To dig into the world of network data, this chapter provides background information
about IP flow related data. Basic information about Netflow related data is explained to
introduce the area of network monitoring.
2.1 IP flows from the network
2.1.1 What is an IP flow?
In network monitoring, IP flow records are an easily available source of information. For
the definition of an IP flow the reader is referred to the RFC 3954 [24] and current IETF
standard, IPFIX (RFC 5101) [25], where an IP flow is defined as,
• IP Flow or Flow: An IP Flow, also called a Flow, is defined as a set of IP packets
passing an Observation Point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets
that belong to a particular Flow have a set of common properties derived from the data
contained in the packet and from the packet treatment at the Observation Point.
• Flow record: A Flow Record provides information about an IP Flow observed at an
Observation Point.
The common properties of flows are also called flow keys and can be defined as fields
in the packet header, particular packet properties and fields resulting from packet treatment
itself. Flow keys commonly used to identify a flow are: (Source IP address, Destination
IP address, Source port, Destination port, IP protocol, byte count).
Depending on the required level of granularity, flows can have more detailed definitions.
In Figure 2.1, some fictive IP addresses are shown to illustrate the structure of a Netflow
record. For privacy reasons, real IP addresses from the data set cannot be shown.
In this case flow records have additional fields and can be written as (Date, Start Time,
Duration, Protocol, Source IP Address, Source Port, Destination IP Address, Destination
Port, Packets, Bytes, Flows). The example of Figure 2.1 shows not only a sample of Netflow
records, but also shows the case of a spamming attack. This can be identified by observing
the multiple incoming messages on port 25.
To typify traffic, sources, destinations, traffic direction and symmetry must be analyzed.
Traffic can be classified between unidirectional and bidirectional modes. In bidirectional
mode traffic can be sent in both directions. This is the most commonly used communication
for two entities. Unidirectional mode means that traffic is only sent in one direction, as
for example in a broadcast application. In addition to the direction of flows, the symmetry
of the flow must be established. Some applications require flows to be bidirectional and
symmetric, which means that traffic flows are sent at the same rate in both directions.
Other applications need bidirectional asymmetric flows, for example in a client-server case
11
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Figure 2.1: Examples for Netflow records
[98], where a client sends small queries that requests large answers (e.g. a document). In
the case of a broadcasting application, the flow is unidirectional and asymmetric, since no
answers are requested.
2.1.2 How to collect IP flows
The process of collecting IP flows from the network is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The moni-
toring of IP flows involves two steps, export using metering tools and collection of the flows.
On the border of a network, routers with flow export functionality (exporters) are placed
to tap network traffic. The exporter monitors packet headers on the monitoring interface
and timestamps are set for each header. Depending on the use of the flows, they may be
filtered or sampled. The update function generates a new flow entry for a packet header if
no matching can be found. These steps are called metering [24, 25]. Expired flow records
are transmitted to the collector which can parse, compress and store the records. Referring
to [24, 25], a flow is considered expired if
• the flow-end has been received,
• the flow is inactive for a certain time,
• a long-lasting flow has been running for longer than a defined timeout,
• or if there are problems in the Exporter.
From the collector, flows can be stored or used for further monitoring purpose or for analysis.
Several network solutions are for flow capture available on the market and the top leaders
in this area also provide their own flow formats. For example Cisco1 developed NetFlow
the most popular IP flow format. sflow [104] is mainly used by D-Link2 or HP3. Smaller
players in network monitoring have also introduced their own formats, for example Jflow
or cflowd by Juniper4 or NetStream by Huawei Technology5 to cite only a few. In the
open-souce domain there are also many tools available, such as nfdump6 or Softflowd7.
1http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6601/products_ios_protocol_group_home.html
2http://www.dlink.com
3http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software/software-solution.html?compURI=tcm:245-936973
4http://www.juniper.net
5http://www.huawei.com/en/
6http://nfdump.sourceforge.net/
7http://www.mindrot.org/projects/softflowd/
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Figure 2.2: Architecture for export and collection of IP flows [25, 24]
2.1.3 A short historical summary: from Netflow records to IPFIX
In 1996, Cisco designed NetFlow as a layer 3 switching path speedup, where its router
and switch caches were re-organized on the basis of per-flow information. This had the
side-effect of evolving into a caching technique for the collection of flow information and
statistics without penalizing overall performance [157, 89]. The currently used version of
Netflow records is NetFlow version 9.
Previously released versions were V1— the original version, V5 — including Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) information and sequence numbers, V7— supports Cisco
Catalyst series switches in hybrid or native mode and V8— supporting aggregation of
Cisco IOS router platforms.
A new feature in NetFlow version 9 is that it is template-based, making it more flexible
and providing new benefits, such as the export of any information from routers and quick
implementation of new features. Furthermore, NetFlow version 9 serves as standard for the
IETF work IPFIX and PSAMP (Pack Sampling) working group.
The mission of the Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF [2], is to enhance the work
and process quality in Internet technologies. The main activity of the IETF is to publish
highly relevant documents for the management, design and use of the Internet and its related
technologies. The IETF combines research and engineering to produce new standards, which
embody best practice for a given domain of research.
The IETF IPFIX working group was created in 2002 to specify a universal standard for
the export of IP flow information from all vendors’ routing devices. The main argument
for this was the need for a universal standard protocol that can be used for measurement,
management and accounting processes for flows. This protocol standard defines the format
and transfer for IP flow information.
NetFlow version 9 (RFC3954) serves as the basis of the new IPFIX standard, but is more
flexible and allows new features, such as the Stream Control Transmission Protocol on Layer
4, and template use. Templates make the collecting process more flexible, since templates
enhance IPFIX messages to be processed without interpretation. In [25] a template is defined
as:
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A Template is an ordered sequence of <type, length> pairs used to completely specify
the structure and semantics of a particular set of information that needs to be commu-
nicated from an IPFIX Device to a Collector. Each Template is uniquely identifiable
by means of a Template ID.
By introducing templates, more information can be provided to the Collector than with
Netflow records alone, due to the options afforded by the template format. For more detailed
information about Netflow and IPFIX, the reader is referred to the corresponding RFCs,
RFC 3954 [24] and RFC 5101 [25].
The IETF IPFIX working group submitted the IPFIX Specification to the Internet En-
gineering Steering Group (IESG) for validation in 2006 and recent advances discussed in
active and pending IPFIX working group documents are published on the IETF website for
IPFIX8.
2.1.4 Major issues with Netflow records
The monitoring of large ISP networks often faces a wide range of problems. The main
activity of network monitoring consists in the detection of unusual and malicious events of
many different types, be they attacks from outside or network problems inside. Monitoring
is required in order to take appropriate countermeasures. From a technical perspective, the
only potentially available network traffic information is Netflow records, since the storage
of full packet captures is impossible. Even storing and analyzing all Netflow records is a
difficult task, because of the huge data volumes (i.e. there might be 60,000 flows/second)
on the network and in near future this problem will become even worse (see Figure 1.2).
A solution to this problem is to use efficient storage methods or to apply strong compres-
sion schemes such that more data can be stored, like presented in [50, 91]. For compressing
Netflow records, one popular approach is sampling used for example in [101, 36], but this dis-
cards data, so an alternative technique is aggregation, where data is simply compressed into
other data, as presented in [68]. The use of IP flows and their storage is a crucial problem,
since Netflow records carry sensitive information about the communication of two entities.
This is a major issue since privacy should be respected, so anonymization techniques are
quite often used to mask sensitive data.
Besides the sensitive data in IP flows, concerning who is communicating with whom,
the data also includes information about what happened on the network. This information
is relevant to detect dependencies and relations between flows and applications [7, 125, 66,
70]. Besides their use in distinguishing dependencies between different kinds of IP flow
information, an important additional feature is that Netflow records can be used for the
identification of anomalies in network traffic.
2.2 Network anomalies
A major threat for network architectures is the various incidents which may occur. This
thesis distinguishes between two types of anomaly: technical anomalies and attacks.
2.2.1 Technical anomalies
From the network management perspective, technical problems may occur at a number of
levels. Anomalies can occur at the
• Hardware level (switch, router, firewall, etc.)
• Software and protocol level (program error, overflow, ....)
• Host level (machine crash, not responding, cable unplugged,...)
8http://tools.ietf.org/wg/ipfix/
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As well as being able to identify technical issues, the analysis of IP flow information can
also identify attacks on the network infrastructure. The type of attack can be anything from
simple spam to highly destructive attacks, such as physical attacks or denial-of-service.
2.2.2 Categories of attack
Before presenting different categories of attack, an attack has to be defined. In [3] from
1980, a threat is defined as,
the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized attempt to access information,
manipulate information and to render a system unreliable or unusable
and an attack as
a specific formulation or execution of a plan to carry out a threat.
Ten years later in [59], a similar definition is introduced for an intrusion or attack, which
can be defined as:
Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the
- Integrity,
- Confidentiality or
- Availability
of a resource.
In literature [57, 62, 127, 122], there are different taxonomies for attacks available. The
authors describe several attacks, the most prominent being:
• Worms — programs propagating by self-replication: very fast propagation through
the network, by means of mass mailing or network-aware worms
• Confidential information gathering such as scanning/sniffing activities — information
is gathered by means of sniffing or scanning the system for information that can be
used to attack further targets.
• Network attacks — this group includes attacks related to session hijacking or spoofing,
etc.
• (Distributed) Denial of Service (D)DoS — Attack that makes a service unavailable or
reduces the level of service available for users
• Botnets — Groups of machines infected with malicious programs that propagate con-
tent without the owner knowing, in order to carry out spam or DoS attacks.
These taxonomies cannot be seen as individual classes for malicious activities, but more as
a simple summary of malicious resources. For example, a worm is malicious code in a useful
program that can perform actions like participating in a (Distributed) Denial of Service,
stealing confidential information, downloading files, etc. This example makes it clear that
the previous taxonomy is only a summary of malicious resources and that one class may
include another.
In addition to determining categories of attacks, two classes of intrusion have to be
distinguished, network-based and host-based. According to [3, 122], a host-based intrusion
targets only specific computers within an architecture. In general, this kind of attack is
intended to consume resources or to crash the host or the applications it runs. Network-based
intrusions target whole network architectures of computers in order to prevent networks from
providing services by degrading network connectivity and consuming all available bandwidth.
The papers presented in the following chapters are only a small selection of papers con-
sidered relevant for a particular research domain. There are of course many other significant
papers related to the highlighted topics, but due to space restrictions only a few were selected
in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
From IP flow monitoring to
dependency identification
Collecting network data is essential for good management and surveillance of a network.
With the increasing size of networks, collection and storage of all network data becomes
infeasible. For a network operator, 60,000 Netflow records per second are common at peak
times. In order to overcome this problem, sampling or aggregation of network data is used.
Sampling [36, 101, 34, 60, 109] is based on the selection of a subset of all network data
whereas in Aggregation [61, 68, 125], many small data items are assembled into fewer larger
items. Besides the aspects of storing data, dependencies between applications and network
components can be detected by analyzing flow data. Another application area for IP flow
data is intrusion detection and anomaly detection. This chapter illustrates some state of
the art methods for these different research topics.
3.1 Sampling methods
In sampling and aggregation approaches, it has to be distinguished between two kinds of
sampling: Flow and Packet-Sampling. In Packet-sampling, each individual packet is sam-
pled with a given probability. In Flow -sampling, packets are sampled on the basis of flow
granularity.
As presented in [60, 109, 21, 101, 127] and others, the sampling of packets, it can be
divided into systematic and random sampling. Systematic packet sampling, as presented
by Cisco [23], became popular due to its simplicity and low overhead. Systematic sampling
is explained in [21] as a method that is based on a 1-out-of-k approach, with a random
selection of one element out of the first k elements followed by every kth element thereafter,
using a random number generator and a counter. Popular systematic approaches can be
event-driven, as in [109, 119] or time-driven, e.g. [21]. Random sampling uses randomly
selected packets, where the sampling probability is fixed or uses an n element selection, e.g.
[22].
In [36], Adaptive NetFlow, a new method for sampling is presented, using for example
an optional Flow counting extension or adaptive sampling rates. This approach introduces
measures for Netflow that overcome some of its drawbacks, for example by using adaptive
linear sampling to optimize memory use. At the beginning a large sampling rate is fixed,
but this will self-adapt if, an overflow occurs. This allows Adaptive NetfFlow to stay below
a fixed memory usage and remains easily configurable since statistical sampling rates are
no longer necessary. [60] refers to non-linear sampling rates for passive measurement. The
sampling rate adjusts its value by observing the number of packets that have been counted
for a given flow. The method uses high sampling rates for small flows and low sampling
rates for large flows. Consequently, the flow size distribution has only a low impact on flow
estimation accuracy. Another size-based sampling approach is presented in [119], where
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class-based sampling is performed. A new data structure is introduced, composite Bloom-
Filters, which filter traffic, allocated it to different classes and optimize memory-usage.
In [38], an approach called Sample and Hold is presented. This approach is dependent of
the packets that are sampled at the router by performing a cache lookup for each packet. If
a packet matches, the flow statistics are updated; otherwise a new cache entry is generated
with a certain probability for a given byte size.
[34] proposes a dynamic control mechanism for sampling that utilizes a threshold-based
sampling technique. This technique relies on size-dependent sampling and estimates the sum
of sample sizes in bytes in order to assess the relative accuracy of sampling. [109] presents
FlexSample, a framework that performs per-packet sampling based on the membership of
packets in sub-populations previously fixed by an operator. This allows traffic to be sampled
over towards a certain class of subpopulations.
Another kind of approach, called Sampled NetFlow, is presented in [125], which presents
a study of the accuracy and information loss for Netflow records and packet traces. The
authors of [125] use a systematic sampling of 1-in-250 for Netflow records. In addition to
this, they captured all packets passively. This allowed them to evaluate the accuracy of
Netflow records. They found in [125] that bandwidth usage grows linearly with the number
of flows and that the overall performance results of systematic and random sampling are
similar.
To conclude this section about sampling, it can be said that the most important points
in sampling are:
• Optimization of memory usage and bandwidth consumption
• Definition of an optimal sampling rate (threshold, random, class-based,....)
• Accurate flow estimation
3.2 Aggregation methods
Aggregation methods for flow records are based on an approach where small flow entries are
assembled into larger entries. Aggregation can be based on flow record entries or on packets,
as in [68, 61, 125] for example. A major advantage of aggregation is that data is assembled
into other data, but is not lost. In [61, 68], two different methods for aggregation of flows
are presented, the first being based on cluster aggregation, and the second on prefix-tree
aggregation.
In [61], a new method for the adaptive aggregation of flows is presented, where traffic
clusters are identified in real-time. A cluster is represented by a 5-tuple having different
combinations of flow information, source/destination IP address, source/destination ports
and number of flow entries.
Figure 3.1 shows the cluster aggregation used by the authors of [61]. For example the
largest cluster (cluster A) holds records having the same source IP address. Inside these
clusters, smaller clusters can be observed holding different combinations of the 5-tuple in-
formation. By aggregating information from different clusters, priorities can be given, the
resolution loss be minimized and the overall memory requirement be optimized by using a
2-dimensional hash-table. A similar method, but for post-processing, has been implemented
in [37], where traffic is grouped into multi-dimensional clusters. The aim of [37], as in [61]
is to identify clusters with the greatest similarity.
An aggregation method that is applied in this thesis relies on prefix-tree aggregation as
presented in [68, 20]. This is a packet-based aggregation method that relies on the approach
to reduce entries over space and time. Aguri [68, 20] is a flow monitoring tool that also allows
aggregation-based traffic profiling in near real-time. Aguri can profile traffic by referring to
prefix-based trees which continuously generate summaries of the monitored network traffic.
An advantage is that Aguri supports both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic.
To generate time-window based trees, packets sharing the longest common IP prefix for
source and destination are matched by using a pre-order traversal of the tree. Patricia trees
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hash value based on flow’s source IP (the left table of hash
number from 0 to 65535 in Figure 1), the other is hash value
based on flow’s destination IP (the top table of hash number
from 0 to 65535 in Figure 1). Take source IP as an example,
hash value of a packet is computed based only on its source
IP, instead of its flow ID of five keys. Packets with the same
source IP will definitely be mapped to the same hash value,
on the other hand, packets with different source IP may be
mapped to the same hash value because of hash collision. Hash
value nodes have a linked list, which consists of all source IP
mapped to this hash value. For instance, in Figure 1, source
IP of 137.8.6.5, 202.75.1.7 and 210.70.1.4 are all mapped
to hash value 115. In addition, every source IP node has a
list, which consists of all flows having this source IP address.
The destination IP dimension of the hash table has a similar
structure. Hash value of a packet is computed based on its
destination IP. Hash value nodes have a linked list, which
consists of all destination IP addresses mapped to this hash
value. For example, in Figure 1, destination IP of 120.0.0.1,
138.0.0.2, and 210.0.0.3 are all mapped to value 130. And
every destination IP node has a list, which consists of all flows
with this destination IP.
Every flow ID node has two parents, one is the previous
node in the source IP list, the other is the previous node
in the destination IP list. For example, in Figure 1, flow S
has a parent of flow R in the source IP list of 202.75.1.7,
and has a parent of flow B in the destination IP list of
120.0.0.1. We only consider clusters containing a fixed source
or destination IP, so we compute hash value based on these
two fields. In the source/destination IP list, we put flow ID
nodes sorted by destination/source IP. This data structure lets
us find flows in one cluster more easily. First, all flows in one
cluster of the same source or destination IP are in one list.
Second, flow ID nodes in source/destination IP list are sorted
by destination/source IP, so it’s easy to aggregate flows in one
cluster of the same srcIP plus the same dstIP.
C. Three levels of clusters
In the data structure, every IP node has a counter to indicate
the number of flow nodes with this IP address. For example,
in Figure 1, source IP node 137.8.6.5 has a counter of 4
to indicate there are totally 4 flows from this source IP.
With this counter, we can easily get a top list for source
and destination IP address. Entries in the top list have a
flow counter and a pointer pointing to the corresponding IP
address node. Now the problem is that the top list is only
for source/destination IP address, not for all combinations. In
addition, different combinations have different priorities to be
aggregated. For example, combination of dstIP plus dstPort
has a higher priority to be aggregated than combination of
only dstIP because it keeps more information.
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N = 30
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Fig. 2. three levels of cluster
Our method is to divide different clusters into three levels.
There is only one global top list, so it’s a mixture of source
and destination IP address. Take a source IP top list node as an
example, we divide different combinations with this source IP
into three levels. 1) The lowest level is L1, flows in L1 cluster
only have the same srcIP. 2) L2 cluster is about combinations
of two keys, flows in L2 cluster can have a) the same srcIP
plus destIP, b) the same srcIP plus srcPort, or c) the same
srcIP plus destPort. 3) L3 cluster is about combinations of
three keys, flows in L3 cluster can have a) the same srcIP
plus destIP plus srcPort, b) the same srcIP plus destIP plus
destPort, or c) the same srcIP plus srcPort plus dstPort.
For example, in Figure 2, the largest ellipse is a L1 cluster
of flows with the same srcIP of 137.8.6.5 (We define it as
cluster A). Flows in this L1 cluster also form two narrower
L2 clusters: cluster B has the same srcIP of 137.8.6.5 plus
the same dstIP of 138.0.0.2; cluster C has the same srcIP
of 137.8.6.5 plus the same dstPort of 80. There are even
two L3 clusters: cluster D and cluster E both have the same
srcIP plus dstIP plus dstPort. Our definition of clusters allows
clusters to overlap. If there exists a L3 cluster, there must
be corresponding L2 cluster(s) and L1 cluster(s). Actually,
L3 cluster ⊆ L2 cluster ⊆ L1 cluster. This example
has several subset relationships including: D ⊂ B ⊂ A,
D ⊂ C ⊂ A, and E ⊂ C ⊂ A. In addition, higher level
clusters have higher priority to be aggregated, because they
keep more information after aggregation. In this example,
when we perform aggregation, cluster D and E have the
highest priority, cluster B and C have the middle priority, and
cluster A has the lowest priority.
D. Algorithm for identifying clusters
Next we illustrate the algorithm to identify appropriate
clusters. The objectives of this algorithm are, first, flow entries
Figure 3.1: Aggregation cluster in [61]
[92], fully binary radix trees with a fixed tree size are used for the creation and update
processes. An advantage of Patricia trees is that memory use and the search time for keys
having variable length are limited. At the end of a time period, trees are optimized by
post-order traversal, where smaller nodes are assembled into their parents such that they
represent IP subnets with smaller prefix sizes.
Figure 3.2: Aggregation process in [68]
Figure .2 shows, how the entries re aggregated int larger ones. To evaluate th moni-
tored traffic, four separate profiles are established: a profile for source addresses, destination
addresses, source protocols and destination protocols. To improve the accuracy of the al-
gorithm in real-time operation, a variant of the Least-Recently-used replacement policy is
applied. The different profiles reflect key information such as, the source address profile,
which can identify popular ftp1 servers, whereas the destination profile is more relevant to
the client side. Aguri can be used for different tasks like monitoring data, analyzing previ-
ously captured data, etc. The major finding of [68, 20] is that the algorithm runs in real-time
with O(log(n)) and that it can generate summaries for time-windows by aggregation of traffic
over small time-windows.
1File transfer Protocol [105]
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3.3 Storage of IP flow records
An efficient storage technique is essential for further processing of network information.
Such a system should have fast data access methods, provide high insertion rates and have
dependable storage methods. Referring to [40], it is distinguished between row- and column-
based techniques, where row-based techniques are considered write-optimized such that high
write performance can be obtained. Column-oriented systems are read-optimized, meaning
that, for a given query, only the necessary columns are read, making the methods optimized
for fast lookups. A recent trend is to use column-oriented storage systems and several are
presented in this chapter.
A new method, NetStore, is presented in [50]. It is an efficient storage infrastructure for
large quantities of network flow data. It uses a column-oriented approach to reduce storage
requirements, query processing and data load times. Column orientation means that data is
stored in columns and not in rows: a column is used for each attribute, where an attribute
is an element of the 5-tuple of a flow record.
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Segments. Each column is further partitioned into fixed sets of values called
segments. Segments partitioning enables physical storage and processing at a
smaller granularity than simple column based partitioning. These design deci-
sions provide more flexibility for compression strategies and data access. At query
time only used segments will be read from disk and processed based on the in-
formation collected from segments metadata structures called index nodes. Each
segment has associated a unique identifier called segment ID. For each column, a
segment ID represents an auto incremental number, started at the installation of
the system. The segment sizes are dependent of the hardware configuration and
can be set in such a way to use the most of available main memory. For better
control over data structures used, the segments have the same number of values
across all the columns. In this ay there is no need to store a record ID for each
value of a segment, and this is one major difference compared to some existing
column stores [11]. As we will show in Section 4 the performance of the system
is related to the segment size used. The larger the segment size, the better the
compression performance and query processing times. However, we notice that
records insertion speed decreases with the increase of segment size, so, there is a
trade off between the query performance desired and the insertion speed needed.
Most of the columns s o segment in co pressed form t and, in a later section
we pr se t the comp ession algorithms used. Column segmentation design is an
important difference compared to traditional row oriented systems that process
data a tuple at a time, whereas NetStore processes data segment at a time, which
translates to many tuples at a time. Figure 3 shows the processing steps for the
three processing phases: buffering, segmenting and query processing.
Fig. 2. NetStore main components:
Processing Engine and Column-Store.
Fig. 3. NetStore processing phases: buffer-
ing, segmenting and query processing.
Column Index. For each column we store the meta data associated with each of
the segments in an index node corresponding to the segment. The set of all index
nodes for the segments of a column represent the column index. The information
in each index node includes statistics about data and different features that are
used in the decision about the compression method to use and optimal data
Figure 3.3: Main modules of NetStore (left) and processing steps (right) [50]
This kind of structure allows faster compression and access. To enable physical storage
of data and flexible compression, columns are subdivided into fixed segments, also providing
a finer granularity for traffic capture. These segments are compressed individually since
the traffic distribution (over working hours, weekends,...) is not uniform and a variety of
compression tech iques are us d, for example variable byte encoding or ev n no compression
at all. The left of Figure 3.3 shows the modul s of NetStore, while on the right illustrates the
process steps of the approach. [50] suggests the use of aggregated data to avoid bias resulting
from micro-variations in traffic. NetStore takes its inspiration from Aguri [68, 67] which is
also able to manage large quantities of IP flow related data by using spatial and temporal
aggregation. The design of NetStore allows to outperform simple row-based systems in terms
of compression and fast lookup of queries.
In earlier work, for example [40], a hybrid architecture is presented. This approach
uses a column-oriented physical storage structure that incorporates a row-based system for
query processing. Indexed and sorted data is divided into column sets, which are known
as projections. This step is similar to [50]. C-Store aims to lower disk accesses per request
and to save disk space by storing each column separately. Light-weight compression is used
to improve the read performance. [48], another column-oriented storage system for large-
scale data, performs high-speed storage and data querying of flow records, by using on-the-fly
compression and indexing. This real-time compression technique uses ComPAX (compressed
adaptive index), an on-line compressed column principle and a bitmap to designate a column.
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This approach is based on a codebook of words, which can reduce the bitmap index size
by performing logical operations on these bitmaps. A preprocessing step can be used in
order to sort flows by using a locality-sensitive hash table in order to improve compression,
similar to that of gzip2 .
A scalable storage system for IP flow records is presented in [90]. The authors aim to
prove that P2P can be used to improve storage scalability and increase query performance
through decentralization. DIPStorage is a platform where both processes and the storage of
IP flow records are distributed/shared across multiple nodes. The main module in DIPStor-
age is a distributed hash table that is responsible for storing flow record subsets. To store
the data, a tank-based view is used: a group of peers stores the network data by referring
to specific conditions, for example by using hash functions. To optimize the process, multi-
how structured storage strategies store two IP flow records
with similar characteristics. The figure shows two flow records
representing two distinct secure shell (ssh) flows having a
common destination port number (22), but different source and
destination IP addresses. In the example above, two hash
functions (f1 and f2) are used for storing each flow record
twice. By using multiple hash functions for storing a single
flow record redundancy is introduced in order to achieve
higher fault tolerance. As f1 is a function of IP source address
and IP destination address, hash results of this function for the
two flow records in the above example are different. This is
shown in the figure by the storage of the two flow records on
different nodes (C and D). Since f2 generates a hash code
based only on the destination port number, which is the same
for the two IP flows in the example, the resulting hash codes
for the two flow records are the same so both flow records will
be stored on the same node. Therefore, DIPStorage is based on
the structured storage strategy. 
A. Tank-based View
For storing data DIPStorage uses attributes from IP flow
records, which include IP addresses and ports from both source
and destination. As observed in the example shown in Fig. 1,
the chosen hash function and the flow keys to which it is
applied highly influence the way the IP flow records with
similar flow keys are distributed in the storage network.
DIPStorage establishes the idea of a tank-based view. A
Tank is a subset of peers which form a group that stores IP
flow records under a specific set of rules. These rules include a
hash function and the corresponding flow keys to which it is
applied.
Drawing from the ideas of JXTA (Juxtapose) [12], a single
tank forms a group of interest that actually stores incoming
data based on a specific attribute. A single tank is able to
completely handle incoming data and queries on it’s own
without requiring other tanks to be working. A single tank is
being constructed using a tank indexer (TI) to manage the
nodes in the respective tank. Although all nodes are equal
within a tank group, they assume data storage responsibilities
in a treelike fashion. Depending on available nodes the tank
may have multiple levels, where each level refines the
granularity of the data stored in the subtree. The more nodes or
respectively peers are available, the more fine-grained the data
routing can be. In case the storage tank uses the source IP
address of the IP flow record as its storage attribute, routing is
done by splitting the IP range by the number of nodes available
on each level. In the IP case, the first level splits the first part of
the IP address, the second the second part and so on. Whenever
a node receives a flow record it calculates its flow ID and
decides, whether it is responsible for that flow record. If not,
then it calculates — based on the flow ID and the known
children — the next hop where to send the flow record to.
Since different tanks in DIPStorage have different storage
rules, search queries can be efficiently routed through the
storage network to find data according to an attribute (for
example the IP source address). More specifically, nodes
within a storage tank can be queried directly, because their
parent tank indexer knows exactly where data may be stored
and therefore redirects the query to a specific subtree. In case
of multiple levels involved, every parent of a subtree sends the
query down to its matching children. It waits for all answers,
aggregates them, and sends them to its own parent. In order to
avoid deadlocks, a time-out prevents a node to wait
indefinitely long for an answer from one of its children. If the
time-out is reached, the parent node can initiate any
administrative tasks needed to rejoin the missing node or to
recover the data lost. By introducing levels of responsibilities,
the system is able to handle failovers efficiently. If a parent
node fails, th  second level of responsibility is delegated
toward child nodes, which shall elect a replacem nt for the
missing node. All child nodes during the election proce s need
to answer in oming queries all together.
B. Multi-Tank Organization
Since a single data tank stores IP flow records based on a
particular IP flow attribute each query that does not contain
that attribute cannot be optimized. This happens because the
query needs to be forwarded to all nodes in all sub-trees as the
information required to route the query is missing. In order to
address this issue, DIPStorage uses several data tanks for
storing the IP flow records under different rules. Fig. 3 shows
how four data tanks are used by DIPStorage to store the IP
flow records based on: source IP address, destination IP
address, source port number, destination port number. Based
on the query received, the query analyzer decides which data
tank is best optimized for answering the query, and then
forwards the query to that tank. 
A traffic management application deals with the generation
Fig. 2.  Tank-based View
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Figure 3.4: Multi-tank view storage process in DIPStorage [90]
tanks are used under different rules in order to search attributes of queries. Figure 3.4 shows
the the multi-tank view for the different attributes of IP flow records. The query analyzer
module handles the queries and tries to make an optimal decision for answering the query
by forwarding the query to particular tank. The flow replicator m dule distribut s the
flows across the tanks. P2P-based approaches are eminently feasible nowadays and allow
storage to be increased simply by adding new nodes to the platform. This has the additional
advantage of providing more computational resources for processing.
2gzip: software for file compression [31]
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3.4 Dependencies in IP flow information
Knowledge of interactions between network flow records is essential for evaluation purposes.
One means of evaluation is to dig into IP records in order to detect dependencies between
flows, because IP-related flows and Netflow records can be used for the detection of failures
or anomalous events in a network. This section presents the state of the art in relevant
techniques for the identification of dependencies between flow information and also depen-
dencies between applications or network components. Much research has been undertaken
over recent years, and can be divided into groups, discussed in the subsections that follow.
3.4.1 Probability-based models
In this section probabilistic models are presented, which use a variety of techniques to
detect failures in networks by analyzing dependencies. In [7], inference graphs are used to
exploit multi-level dependencies for fast, accurate problem localization. The paper describes
a performance tool, Sherlock, used for the detection of faults and performance problems.
The Inference graph itself is used to display dependencies between all components, while
the Ferret algorithm, a ranking algorithm using scoring functions, generates the necessary
dependency vectors. The inference graph shows the different dependencies in the IT in-
frastructure. The dependencies are estimated by the Ferret algorithm, which calculates the
dependency probabilities that explain the observations. The chosen inference graph provides
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Figure 9: Inferred service dependency graphs for clients access-
ing the main web portal and the sales website. There is signifi-
cant overlap in their dependencies.
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Figure 10: Inferred service dependency graph for clients ac-
cessing a file server.
to the web- and file-servers, mimicking user behavior by browsing
webpages, launching searches, and fetching files. We also installed
packet sniffers at R1 and 5 routers in the datacenter, enabling us to
conduct experiments as if Agents were present on all clients and
servers connected to these routers. These servers include our or-
ganization’s internal web portal, sales website, a major file server,
and servers that provide name-resolution and authentication ser-
vices. Traffic from the clients to the data center was spread across
four disjoint paths using Equal Cost Multi-Path routing (ECMP).
In addition to the field deployment, we use both a testbed and
simulations to evaluate our techniques in controlled environments
(Section 6.2). The testbed and simulations enable us to study Fer-
ret’s sensitivity to errors in the Inference Graphs and compare
its effectiveness with prior fault localization techniques, including
Shrink [6] and SCORE [7].
6.1 Discovering Service Dependencies
We now evaluate Sherlock’s algorithm for discovering service-
level dependencies and quantify the amount of data and time re-
quired for stable results. We carefully examined the service-level
dependency graphs computed by Sherlock for fifteen production
web and file servers in our organization, and we corroborated the
correctness and completeness of these dependencies with our sys-
tem administrators. Below, we show the dependency graphs for two
typical web servers and one file server, and we highlight the lessons
we learned.
Figure 9 shows the service-level dependency graphs for vis-
iting our organization’s main web portal and sales website. Ar-
rows point from servers that provide essential services to servers
or activities that depend on these services. Edges are annotated
with weights which represent the strength of the dependencies.
Two things are worth noting. First, clients depend on name lookup
servers (DNS, WINS), authentication servers (Domain Controller),
and proxy servers to access either of these websites. Clients must
communicate with the authentication servers to validate certificates
that control access and use the proxy servers to retrieve external
pages that are embedded in the websites’ pages. Second, both web-
sites also share substantial portions of their back-end dependencies.
The same search server crawls both websites and generates indexes
that are used by the websites to answer client queries. The pres-
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Figure 11: Dependency probabilities for accessing the web por-
tal converge to stable values as the inference engine receives
more samples from clients.
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Figure 12: Dependency probabilities for accessing the web por-
tal converge as the inference engine aggregates samples from
more clients.
ence of such overlap in production environments bodes well for our
techniques, as it means Sherlock can construct succinct Inference
Graphs and Ferret can localize faults with fewer observations.
Figure 10 shows the dependency graph for visiting a major file
server. As before, clients depend on DNS, WINS, Domain Con-
troller (DC), and proxy servers to access the file server. Inter-
estingly, clients actually depend on four different file servers –
FileServerA-FileServerD to access the main file server. It turns out
that the name of the main file server is just the root name of a
distributed file system. The actual files are stored on several file
servers, each of which is responsible for a portion of the name
space. The client requests are sent to the file servers based on the
location of the clients and the requested files.
To summarize, our observations are three-fold. First, there is sig-
nificant variety in service-level dependencies – some servers redi-
rect a majority of their requests while others exclusively serve the
requests locally. Second, even when two services appear to have
similar dependencies, there are differences in the strength of the
dependencies. For instance, clients may heavily depend on domain
controllers to access certain web servers which contain lots of sen-
sitive information, but this does not apply to accessing the web por-
tal. Finally, dependencies change over the time – we have seen con-
tent move across machines from one building to another. Hence, we
conclude that an automated algorithm for inferring dependencies is
necessary and useful.
Impact of number of samples: Section 4.1 describes how Sher-
lock computes service-level dependency graphs by aggregating the
results from multiple clients. In this section we examine how many
samples are required to produce stable probability estimates. Fig-
ure 11 shows how dependency probabilities for clients accessing
the web portal converge as the algorithm uses more samples. We
Figure 3.5: Dependency graph in [7]
the input for the Ferret algorithm, which calculates the vectors and applies the established
confidence levels to output a list of ranked vectors. Sherlock is a centralized inference engine
with distributed agents. It is responsible for the creation of the service-level dependency
graphs. The agents monitor traffic sent/received by one/more hosts and calculate for each
service the dependencies and response-times. Data aggregation provides the service-level
dependency graph. The final step is to combine this service-level dependency graph with
the IT topology in an inference graph. The service-level dependency graph for two web
portals is presented In Figure 3.5. Arrows indicate the main services, and the edges are
weighted with the dependency probabilities. The observations are three-fold. First, the
service dependencies vary considerably, some servers redirect requests, while others handle
them locally. Second, even where service dependencies seem very similar, it has been proven
that the dependency strength is not identical. As a last argument the authors can prove
in [7] that service dependencies vary over time. In summary, [7] introduces a complex tool
for heterogenous network components that is able to catch failures and service problems by
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using a multi-level probabilistic model.
In another work, [6], Leslie graphs represent dependencies of components in networks
at different granularities, for example at the granularity of IP-addresses, hosts, etc. Leslie
graphs are used for fault localization, reconfiguration planning, helpdesk optimization and
anomaly detection. The aim is to present a generic representation of the web of dependencies.
Another module, called the Constellation module, monitors packets and maps them onto
Leslie graphs, while the AND module extends these graphs by adding some additional data,
such as layer 3 trace route probabilities. Dependencies are derived by passively monitoring
network traffic, activity patterns being deduced by the Constellation and AND tool with
the Leslie graphs being approximated on demand afterwards. The outcomes are twofold.
First, network topologies can be discovered and second, dependencies can be estimated
through the use of Leslie graphs. This method is also feasible in larger networks, but has
the disadvantage of needing full packet traces.
[116] presents a new model for failure diagnosis in IP networks. Shrink is a top-down
approach for network diagnosis, using Bayesian networks. By modifying the Bayesian net-
work, diagnosis time and accuracy can be improved. The main aim is to build a Bayesian
network with data and apply an inference model to it in order to detect failures based on
probabilities. The idea works well for link failures, but it has not yet been proven that it
also works for TCP connections.
The aim in [112] is to design a tool to overcome bottlenecks in systems by using black-
box nodes. Distributed systems are represented as a graph of communicating nodes with
a causal path, a series of node traversals caused by external system requests. The tool
finds high-impact causal path patterns and identifies most the nodes which add the most
latency to the pattern. The method includes three main steps, first, online discovery and
tracing of patterns of communication; second, inferring causal paths and patterns oﬄine;
and finally visualization of the results. The trace contains at least three parameters (time-
stamp, sender, receiver) for each message. The method uses the “nesting algorithm” and
the “convolution algorithm”. The tool shows promising results, even if the technique is
complex, due to its use of traces that are converted into time signals.
[113] describes a method to avoid bottlenecks by caused delays in distributed systems.
The model is divided into four stages: the first traces the socket API calls per application of
each host, which the second reconciles into single trace with one message per machine (time-
stamp and clock of sender receiver are parameters). The third step performs a causality
analysis leading to final presentation of the results as trees or timelines. The paper sets
out a new causal path model and the corresponding algorithm. The results are estimated
by finding and scoring parent messages represented in tree form with probabilities. The
problem is that capturing the traces for sender and receiver can easily become complex with
multi-homed hosts.
Paper [9] discusses a solution for automatically identifying traces of dependent mes-
sages among web services. The system is based on correlations between messages that are
exchanged between services. Message dependencies are discovered through causal depen-
dencies which result from a probabilistic dependency graph, with the aim of representing
the final results in form of a pruned graph or path.
3.4.2 Rule-based and correlation-based models
Another approach in this field is to use rule-based or correlation-based models for the analysis
of dependencies in traffic information.
In [163], interaction between central system binaries is used to create dependency graphs.
The paper distinguishes between two kinds of dependencies, data and call dependencies,
where call dependencies are calls between functions and sites and data dependencies repre-
sent the definition and use of values. The method relies on “network analysis” techniques
known for human networks by describing the network neighbourhood just as in social con-
texts. Correlations are established by statistical methods through the use of regression. By
splitting the data set into training and test sessions, [163] the paper aims to predict defects
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by applying network measures on dependency graphs. Network measures on dependency
graphs have been shown to be effective in finding defects and perform better than more
complex measures.
In [117], a rule mining technique is applied to time series of traffic to extract communica-
tion patterns from traces, without focussing on any particular trace. The hypothesis is that
groups of flows occurring together are likely to be dependent. Traces are portioned out into
time windows which are then analyzed. Candidate rules are generated and are those that
remain following an information theoretic signal processing step. By applying the generated
Trace Collected at... Type Length Unique Flows Size
LabAccess Our Lab (CSAIL@MIT)’s access link to the Internet Conn. Rec rds  hrs ,,  GB
LabEnterprise Link facing internal Lab Servers Conn. Records  hrs ,  GB
Enterprise Link between Microso*’s Research and corporate LANs Pkt Headers  hrs ,  GB
HotSpot- Access link for the SIGCOMM’ wireless LAN Pkt. Headers  days , MB
HotSpot- Access Link for the OSDI’ wireless LAN Pkt. Headers  ays , . GB
Table : Dataset of traces we have tested eXpose with.
Figure : Rules identi,ed by eXpose from among the many possible rules.
-e ,gure has a circle (in blue) for each possible rule and a star (in red) for
rules that are identi,ed as signi,cant. Signi,cant rules come in di.erent
forms; simply looking for high joint probability (highz) is not enough.
traces. !e di"erences in the rules from the various locations pro-
vide insights into the characteristics of each environment.
4.2 Metrics
One of the metrics we care about is breadth; we want to extract
broad rules that represent patterns for a majority of the tra#c. In
each of our traces, we were able to discover dependencies for a
signi$cant proportion of user actions— web browsing, email, $le-
server access, instant messaging, peer-to-peer tra#c and multime-
dia content. We care about both correctness and completeness of
our rules. False negatives are patterns that are expected to exist in a
trace but are not discovered by eXpose. We checked with adminis-
trators at both our lab and the corporate enterprise and report the
patterns missed by eXpose. False positives are %ow-pairs that are
scored highly by eXpose but have no reasonable explanation. We
aggressively assume every rule we could not explain to be a false
positive and mention the sources for such rules in our traces.
4.3 Nature of the Rule-Mining Problem
Identifying signi$cant rules from among the many possibilities is
tricky. For the LabEnterprise trace, Fig.  plots in (blue) circles each
of the potential rules and in (red) stars each of the rules eXpose iden-
ti$es as signi$cant. Clearly, signi$cant rules come in di"erent forms,
some involve activities that happen rarely, both individually and to-
gether (near the (,,) corner), others involve one rare activity and
one frequent activity (near the (,,) and (,,) corners), and yet
others involve a pair of frequent activities (close to the (,,) cor-
ner). Simply looking for pairs with high joint probability (points
with z > const) or looking for pairs with high conditional proba-
bility ( zx > const) does not su#ce.
Before detailing the kinds of rules discovered by eXpose, we
present the bigger picture. eXpose augments a packet trace with
generics–abstract versions of the real %ows, evaluates many poten-
tial %ow/generic pairs to extract the signi$cant rules and clusters to-
gether rules that are similar to one other. Table  shows for each of
our traces the progression of eXpose through each of these phases.
In this context, it is easy to place our chief contribution—a tech-
nique to identify the few hundred signi$cant patterns from among
the 1010 − 1012 possibilities. To achieve this, eXpose selectively
biases search by not evaluating rules that are unlikely to be useful.
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Figure: Annotated Snapshot of eXpose’s output showing the rules learnt
by eXpose for the HotSpot- Trace. A user can click on a pattern to see
more information about the corresponding rule. Nodes in the graph rep-
resent /ow activities and edges representing rules join the two activities
involved in each rule.
Second, eXpose abstracts away extraneous%ow details to make use-
ful patterns more discernible. !ird, eXpose scores the candidate
rules with an appropriate statistical measure and mines e#ciently.
Finally, eXpose aggregates the inferred rules into a small number of
useful patterns that an admin can corroborate and use. Fig. shows
an annotated snapshot of eXpose’s output.
4.4 Evaluation in Controlled Settings
A key obstacle in evaluating a rule miner like eXpose is the lack
of ground-truth information for traces in the wild. To circumvent
this, we ran eXpose on a three hour trace from a single client desk-
top. We discovered all the expected communication rules includ-
ing, the dependence with DNS; the accesses to the yp server during
logins; and the rules for NFS access. Unexpectedly, we found de-
pendencies for certain o+en browsed web-sites. eXpose found rules
for how advertisements and images are synchronously fetched from
other servers whenever the client browsed the main page of a web
site. Further, we injected arti$cial tra#c wherein pairs of %ows at
random would either be independent of each other or dependent.
eXpose was successful at discovering rules for the dependent %ows.
We also cra+ed tra#c that occurs together always but is separated
by a time gap greater than eXpose’s choice of time window size. As
expected, eXpose did not discover these dependencies. Similar to
prior work [, ], we share the belief that dependent yet separated
by long time gap %ow pairs are not common in practice and defer
$nding such pairs to future work.
4.5 Micro-Evaluation
We $rst evaluate some of eXpose’s design choices.
Is Selective Biasing Useful? Recall eXpose selectively biases the
search to avoid pairs that are unlikely to be dependent. While the
details of how eXpose picks rules to evaluate are elsewhere (§.),
here we verify its usefulness. On the HotSpot- trace, eXpose $nds
, signi$cant rules from among the , %ow pairs that it
evaluates for a hit-rate of 3.9× 10−2 . Doing away with some of our
biasing constraints (speci$cally the constraint that %ow pairs have
Figure 3.6: eXpose output from generated rules [117]
rules, it is possible to detect dependencies among flow groups and applications. An example
is given in Figure 3.6, where the rules learnt from the activities are represented. Here, nodes
in the figure are flow activities and edges the interaction of the activities involved in rules.
The results of the eXpose technique provide some interesting insights into dependencies
between traces.
[69] presents a semi-automated method to mine large sets of network con ection logs
and extract the apparent structure of application sessions in those connections. It processes
connection-level traffic traces and operates in two stages: first, session extraction and second,
structure abstraction. Session extraction is a statistica algorithm for reducing str ams of
connections to a stream of sessions. The paper notes that it is limited to the capture of
a pair of hosts but could be generalized for multiple hosts. Structure abstraction relies on
reduction/generalization rules to abstract the sessions and to provide insights about them. A
session can be singleton (itself), homogenous (consecutive invocations of same applications)
or mixed (involving different types of connection). The session descriptors for the abstraction
structure are based on regular expressions and are used to derive a graphic visualization, by
applying the tool GraphViz [4].
In [74], a dependency discovery algorithm for Netflow data is introduced. This algorithm
detects correlations between flow events by using a semantic table. By applying rule mining,
a dependency is composed fr m four association rules based on semantics set out in the table.
A major advantage of this method is that the semantic classes can also explore the type of
an identified dependency. This method provides an accurate tool for business and support
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decisions.
[30] introduces a new approach for the discovery component and network dependencies,
by applying IP flow information attributes to a flexible inference mechanism. A major
characteristic in their model is that they use start/end timestamps in Netflow time series
in order to detect whether one Netflow triggers another one. The inference mechanism uses
timestamps and confidence correlations to determine the degree of each dependency.
3.4.3 Social behaviour-based models
Examining to the “social behaviour” of hosts is another approach to determining depen-
dencies in Network traffic. The premise of BLINC, described in [70], is to classify traffic
flows by application, where internet hosts are associated with particular applications. The
process is operating without foreknowledge: the behaviour of hosts is observed on several
levels and an evaluation is made by referring to statistical methods for classification. The
classification has different levels: social, functional and application levels. The difference
between those levels is the way they capture traffic and associate an application with a host.
The method how the traffic flows are classified is interesting. The method differentiates
!
Figure 3.7: Dependencies in BLINC [70]
between social, functional and application levels it is possible to detect anomalies only by
the different classification levels. For example by looking at the social level classification,
it is possible to detect the behaviour of a host, whether it is using web, peer-to-peer, etc.If
this is the case, it can be observed whether the host participates in communities, having
the same group of destination IPs, which means that the probability is quite high that the
host is participating in gaming or peer-to-peer activities. Two examples are given in Figure
3.7. The right part of the Figure shows an attack, where a malign host scans on the active
address space in order to find vulnerabilities at port level. The left part of the Figure 3.7
illustrates streaming and its interactions. Additionally, findings in [70] show that if, a spe-
cial type of community called clique is detected, it is highly probable that malware activity,
caused for example by a worm, is taking place. At the functional level, it can be observed
if a host is either a service provider or a consumer. The application level then can use these
functional levels to associate applications to hosts by the associate flows. Heuristics are used
to refine the classification by means of these “graphlets”, which represent the behaviour of
an application.
Another hypothesis, also relying on social behaviour of hosts is described in [63], which
introduces a new type of graph for monitoring, analyzing and visualizing network traffic
flows. The main difference from BLINC is that here, not only the host level is consid-
ered. Monitoring host interactions by applying traffic dispersion graphs (TDGs) derived
from Netflow records can detect abnormal phenomena like legacy port abuse or malicious
network activity. A TDG is a graphical representation of the interaction between nodes.
New in this approach is that traffic visualization is not done by volume on a per flow ba-
sis, but instead represented at different levels like packet, flow and host level. The TDGs
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themselves represent the interaction pattern. The main goal of this new graph type is to rep-
resent network-wide social behaviour and to distinguish the nature of applications through
vizualization in TDG form.
[1] presents a method for detecting communities of interest by examining the popularity
of target hosts and the frequency of their interactions with peers. From the behaviour of
the communities detected, the authors aim to detect, whether there is a defect or anomaly.
3.5 Approaches to Netflow record analysis and evalua-
tion
A recent trend in the evaluation of IP flow data relies on intelligent evaluation methods
developed in other domains like bioinformatics, natural language processing etc., for example
by applying machine learning approaches.
Fig. 1. Packet Rule Classification: FH (flow header), PP (packet payload),
MI (meta-information) indicate rule attributes according to predicate classes;
disjoint packet rule classification illustrated by different colors.
Meta-Information Rules: include no PP predicates, do in-
clude MI predicates, and may include FH predicates.
The relationship between the classification of packet rules
and the classification of the underlying predicates is illustrated
in Figure 1; each circle illustrates the set of rules with
attributes corresponding to the predicate classification FH, PP,
and MI. The packet rule classification is indicated by colors.
IV. PACKET AND FLOW RULES IN PRACTICE
Snort [2] is an open-source IDS that monitors networks
by matching each packet it observes against a set of rules.
Snort can perform real-time traffic and protocol analysis to
help detect various attacks and alert users in real time. Snort
employs a pattern matching model for detecting network attack
packets using identifiers such as IP addresses, TCP/UDP port
numbers, ICMP type/code, and strings obtained in the packet
payload. Snort’s rules are classified into priority classes, based
on a global notion of the potential impact of alerts that match
each rule. Each Snort rule is documented along with the poten-
tial for false positives and negatives, together with corrective
measures to be taken when an alert is raised. The simplicity
of Snort’s rules has made it a popular IDS. Users contribute
rules when new types of anomalous or malicious traffic are
observed. A Snort rule is a boolean formula composed of
predicates that check for specific values of various fields
present in the IP header, transport header, and payload.
Our flow-level rules were constructed from the following
features of flow records: source port, destination port, #pack-
ets, #bytes, duration, mean packet size, mean packet inter-
arrival time, TCP flags, protocol, ToS, ”source IP address
is part of Snort home net”, ”destination IP address is part
of Snort home net”, ”source IP address is an AIM server”,
”destination IP address is an AIM server”. The Snort home net
is commonly configured to whatever local domain the operator
desires to protect from attacks originating externally.
We construct flow level predicates in the following ways:
(1) For categorical features like protocol or TCP flags, we use
as many binary predicates as there are categories. For example,
if the protocol feature could only take on the values {ICMP,
UDP, TCP} then an ICMP packet would be encoded as the
predicate ICMP=1, UDP=0, and TCP=0.
(2) For numerical features such as #packets, we want to be
able to finely threshold them, so that a rule with a predicate
specifying, e.g. an exact number of packets, can be properly
captured. Our predicates take the form “feature > threshold”.
Our system seeks to leverage ML algorithms in order to
raise Snort alerts on flow records. To train our ML algorithms
we require concurrent flow and packet traces so that the
alerts that Snort raises on packets can be associated with
the corresponding flow record. ”Correspondence” here means
that the packets and flow originate from the same underlying
connection. In other words, if Snort has raised an alert on a
packet at time t then we locate the flow with the same IP
5-tuple, start time ts, and end time te such that ts ≤ t ≤ te.
We then associate the packet alert with the flow. A single
packet may raise multiple Snort alerts, and a single flow will
often correspond to a sequence of packets, which means that
individual flows can be associated with many Snort alerts.
V. MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS
Formally our task is as follows. For each Snort rule our
training data takes the form of a pair (xi, yi) where flow i has
flow features xi, and yi ∈ {−1, 1} indicates whether flow i
triggered this Snort rule. Our aim is to attribute to each Snort
rule a score in the form of a weighted sum
∑
k wkpk(x) over
the flow level predicates pk(x) described in Section IV. When
this score exceeds an operating threshold θ, we have an ML
Alarm. Since ML alarms should closely mimic the original
Snort alarms yi, the weights wk are chosen to minimize
the classification error
∑
i I(yi $= sign(
∑
k wkpk(x) − θ).
However, deployment considerations will determine the best
operating threshold for a given operating point.
Supervised linear classifiers such as Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVMs) [15], Adaboost [16] and Maximum En-
tropy [17] have been successfully applied to many such
problems. There are two primary reasons for this. First, the
convex optimization problem is guaranteed to converge and
optimization algorithms based either on coordinate or gradient
descent can learn millions of examples in minutes (down from
weeks ten years ago). Second, these algorithms are regularized
and seldom overfit the training data. This is what our fully
automated training process requires: scalable algorithms that
are guaranteed to converge with predictable performance.
Preliminary experiments established that, on average, Ad-
aboost accuracy was significantly better than SVMs. In the
remainder of this section we therefore highlight the properties
of Adaboost that make it well-suited for our application. A
linear algorithm like Adaboost works well here because the
actual number of features is large. In theory, each numerical
feature (e.g., source port or duration) may generate as many
flow level predicates of the form “feature > threshold” (such
predicates are called stump classifiers) as there are training
examples. In practice, this potentially large set of predicates
does not need to be explicitly represented. Adaboost has an in-
cremental greedy training procedure that only adds predicates
needed for finer discrimination [16].
Figure 3.8: Relationship between predicates and packet rule classification [33]
The first machine learning approach is the rule-based method, as presented in [33]. The
authors present a machine learning approach that learns flow rules from packet signatures.
Rules are defined as sets of predicates, which are extracted from flow and packet data. These
predicates are flow-header (FH), packet payload (PP) and meta-information (MI). Disjoint
classes for rules are established for example for header only rules or meta-information only
rules. Figure 3.8 shows the classification of the packet rules and redicate relationships. A
machine learning approach is applied, called Adaboost [47] which is a meta-algorithm that
can be used with other learning approaches to improve accuracy. The classifier can raise
alerts on Snort [114] on detecting an anomalous event in IP flow records.
Another work [11] has an approach based on association rules for extracting anomalies
from backbone networks. The authors refer to meta-data from histogram-based detectors
and a machine learning approach to classify anomalous events occurring during a time
interval.
The histogram detectors record extracted features and provide relevant meta-data from
flows, for example, port, IP address, etc. These histograms are binned and the similarities
for the given time interval calculated. The motivation in [11] for association rules is that
suspicious data has similar characteristics. The Apriori algorithm is used for the generation
of the association rule mining. This algorithm can be used for the generation of association
rules since it discovers frequent item-sets in data sets.
Machine learning take advantage of kernel methods, strong mathematical tools, which
have found their utility in the evaluation of large and complex data sets. Kernel methods
were introduced as a mathematical tool in early the 1900’s by Hilbert, and were first applied
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Figure 3.9: Anomaly detection with histogram-detectors and association rules [11]
as an element of machine learning techniques in the late 1990’s by Vapnik [137], then further
developed in the early 2000’s by Scho¨lkopf et al. [121]. In the recent past, kernel functions
have been applied in many domains, e.g. Bioinformatics [139], Natural Language Processing
[26], and can be applied to many different input formats, whether structured (e.g. graphs,
trees) or unstructured (e.g. text).
There is a great deal of literature concerning the application of support vector machines
(SVMs) in many disciplines. For example [28] is a work based on kernel methods. A
similarity measurement is calculated for input trees consisting of parsed and pre-processed
sentences from news reports. These are then decomposed into tree-like structures. Support
Vector Machines (SVMs) with tree kernel functions are then applied to classify sequences
according to their similarity values. Another work that refers to SVMs is presented in [115].
Here, SVMs are used to classify Internet traffic, into different categories of applications by
extracting parameters from packet headers. Different kernels for the SVMs are evaluated
to obtain the best classification results. A major disadvantage of using these supervised
learning algorithms is that that they require (labelled) training data.
For the classification of flows, another approach is to use Clustering, as presented in [86].
Different parameters from header traces resulting from various applications are extracted
and applied to the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, such that data is classified
into different clusters. The EM-algorithm belongs to the soft clustering algorithm class,
where one data point can be attributed to several clusters, depending on the probability
density distribution. With aid of this algorithm, data is clustered by application type and
the evaluation shows that good results can be achieved for most, but not all traffic types.
In [65], Netflow-level statistics are evaluated by using the Naive Bayes classifier. The
aim of applying this machine learning algorithm to Netflow records is to provide a tool
for the classification of Netflow records according to the corresponding applications. In
[71], classifiers such as Naive Bayes, k-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) and SVMs are applied
to statistics from flows in order to detect anomalous traffic sources. Another approach is
presented in [80] which analyzes Botnet traffic. By extracting parameters such as IP address,
port, TCP flags, etc., from packet headers. After cleaning the flow samples, machine learning
algorithms as Naive Bayes, decision trees (C4.5) and Bayesian networks are applied to classify
into normal and botnet traffic. [156] reports a performance comparison of five classification
algorithms for the evaluating IP flow traffic. The evaluated algorithm are the most poplar
ones: C4.5, Naive Bayes, Bayesian networks and Naive Bayes Tree algorithm. The results
of this evaluation are that the classification accuracy is similar for all algorithms, but there
are significant variations in performance.
Semi-supervised learning approaches focus on data sets with only a small amount of
labelled data and many unlabelled data samples. Methods such as k-means [58], a traditional
clustering method, assume that adjacent data samples tend to have similar labels with the
result that they propagate their labels to unlabelled data samples and so, cannot detect new
types of attack.
In [161], the authors present a new label propagation algorithm targeted at classification.
The algorithm is based on the idea of the semi-supervised clustering algorithm. A schematic
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description of the label propagation algorithm is presented in Chapter 8, Figure 8.4. The
main idea is to construct a fully-connected graph, in which only some nodes are labelled.
Each label represents the class name of the node. The edges between two nodes have
associated weights, which depend on the distance between two nodes and are controlled
by the weight factor σ adjusts the label-propagation quality. All labels are propagated
iteratively to unlabelled regions and nodes are either labelled or unlabelled data samples.
Unlabelled nodes are assigned iteratively estimated class-fellowship probabilities that give
the probability that an item is associated with a class. At the end of the iterations, each
unlabelled node is allocated to the most probable class, that is the class with the highest
class-fellowship score. Further relevant work related to semi-supervised learning is presented
in [35]. The authors present a new semi-supervised algorithm which classifies information
extracted from full packet traces into different types and applications. A major advantage
of using semi-supervised algorithms is that both known and unknown anomalies can be
detected, as this kind of algorithm can use either labelled and unlabelled data.
Other works, for example in [97] or [140] are based on the use of entropies. In [97], the au-
thors set out to identify anomaly patterns in traffic distributions by applying entropy-based
approaches. They evaluate pair-wise correlations between entropy time-series to highlight
correlated features. In [140], the authors provide a proof-of-concept of worm detection in
fast IP networks by applying entropy-based calculations. In [76], anomalies are tracked by
referring to traffic feature distributions; a direct application of statistics and entropy is used
to observe changes in the distributions.
Simpler evaluation methods use statistics, heuristics and visualization models or a com-
bination of these three domains. An example is Aguri [67] presented in section 3.2. In a
subsequent publication [68], the authors present a simple approach for the identification
of Denial-of-Service and Flooding attacks. Through aggregation and statistical evaluation
(number of IP addresses, ports, traffic volume etc.) of traffic summaries, the authors were
able to detect these two types of attack without further processing simply by analyzing the
generated traffic profiles.
A common approach is to use visualization techniques for the evaluation of traffic data.
In the field of network intrusion detection, visualization has also become a popular comple-
mentary instrument, with approaches that range from simple statistical value representation
to highly complex machine learning based schemes. An example is Foresti et al. [43]. The
authors use visualization to represent network alerts. Visualization can also be used at lower
levels. In [52], the authors refer to a Netflow record repository as input that is transformed
and stored in a database. A network operator can then choose between different visualiza-
tion techniques, including various histograms or flows, which are represented as a graph in a
circular manner. [52] presents a tool called FlowViz that uses a similar coloured rectangular
representation for showing the usage of ports. Gonzalez-Arevalo et al. [51] propose that a
flow is modeled as set of packets and a segment in the image represents a single connection
in a two-dimensional space. To avoid collisions of parallel connections, randomly chosen
heights are used. Patole et al. [102] use Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), while Mansmann
et al. [9] represent data in the form of TreeMaps, tree-like maps for dynamic intrusion
detection.
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3.6 Limitations and advantages
The dependency models presented in this chapter rely mainly on data that is provided
by business enterprises. The previously-presented approaches are content-dependent; for
example social-behaviour based approaches use applications as a basis for identifying de-
pendencies. Other approaches use enterprise network traffic for the identification of bugs
and machine crashes. The advantages of these approaches is that they cover the needs of
enterprise networks and allow quick reaction when an incident occurs. This is also possible
due to the restricted quantity of network traffic in an enterprise network. Since technical
problems can also be identified with these techniques, system crashes or printer failures can
easily be repaired. This simplifies life for network operators.
The major problem with these approaches that they cannot be applied in Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) due to scalability issues. The workload in terms of traffic at the ISP
level cannot be compared to an enterprise workload. A variety of approaches are used to
analyze full packet captures in order to identify service dependencies between applications
and services. This provides deep insights into the activities on a network. What is more, the
presented approaches are specifically designed for security purposes such as the detection of
worms. Approaches at the ISP level have to cover a wider range of different anomalies and
attacks and provide useful results when faced with new and unknown incidents.
From the perspective of evaluation, machine learning algorithms perform well in the
area of intrusion detection and traffic analysis. Depending on the traffic information used, a
good choice of the algorithm is essential for achieving acceptable classification accuracy and
computation efficiency. Supervised learning approaches achieve good results, but a major
drawback is that unknown attacks cannot be detected, since this techniques requires labelled
data. A remedy to this is to use unsupervised or semi-supervised learning, since here only
a small amount of labelled data or even none at all is enough to deliver good classification
results. A further advantage is that such algorithms are able to detect previously unseen
anomalies.
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Part II
Contributions
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Part A:
Netflow record analysis using
machine learning
Introduction
This part of the thesis presents the research contributions that have been achieved. It is
based on the evaluation of flow information by applying several different evaluation strate-
gies. The first approach is to analyze simple sequences of Netflow records, searching for
anomalies. A new method for the processing of simple Netflow records that combines kernel
functions with machine learning techniques for detecting anomalies is presented. A new
kernel function that operates over sequences of Netflow records by analyzing contextual and
quantitative information has been designed. To detect IP flow record anomalies, analysis
results from the distance function are used in a machine learning module that leverages the
Support Vector Machines for classification.
This initial approach is extended by a second, which introduces a tree-like summariza-
tion technique for Netflow records. The aggregated Netflow record structures are analyzed
by focussing on topological and quantitative aspects. In a first evaluation method, Netflow
records are analyzed for anomalies by using a data mining algorithm for classification. In
a follow-up chapter, Game Theory is used to model the attack strategies an attacker can
use with knowledge of defence strategies. The aim is to evaluate the kernel function defence
strategies available to network administrators. The final chapter, the kernel function ap-
proach is evaluated on sparse data sets by using Phase Space Analysis, such that missing
dimensions can be reconstructed through time series.
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Chapter 4
Single Netflow analysis
Anomaly detection using machine learning
This chapter addresses the topic of using machine learning techniques to analyze Netflow
records from a large-scale network. Peak rates of 60,000 flows per second are a common
phenomenon in large-scale networks. This huge quantity of data makes analysis difficult,
both in terms of computational resources and scientific methodology. A new approach for
analyzing large volumes of IP ow related data by defining a kernel function is described that
is able to track topological and quantitative changes in traffic. The objective is to detect
trafc anomalies and to characterize network trafc by applying for example a machine learning
algorithm, as the support vector machine algorithm (SVM). Therefore the contribution of
the current chapter is two-fold,
• Definition of a kernel function to compare Netflow records
• Use of an SVM-based approach for detecting anomalies in Netflow records.
4.1 A kernel function for Netflow processing
The detection of anomalies in Netflow record data requires a sequence of steps that are
presented in this chapter. Netflow records have been described in section 2.1; to summarize
they include all relevant network traffic information in a compressed format. A first step in
the analysis of network traffic, is to manipulate the time-series of Netflow records such that
they can be compared with each other. To achieve this, Netflow records are divided on the
basis of a time interval, also known as time window. A time window can be defined as a fixed
time slice (e.g. 5 seconds) during which Netflow flows are recorded. A major challenge for the
analysis was to define an approach that can capture traffic pattern changes. Support vector
machines analyze and identify patterns by using complex methods to map data in order to
make it distinct in a higher dimensional space. Therefore, a mathematical transformation of
Netflow records that is able to represent quantitative and topological information of these
flows in a numerical form is needed.
In [137], a kernel function K is defined as a mapping of K : X × X ∈ [0,∞[ from an
original input space X to a similarity score K(x, y) =
∑
i φi(x)φi(y) = φ(x) · φ(y), where
φi(x) describes a feature function over a data snippet x. A general property of a kernel
function is symmetry, such that [K(x, y) = K(y, x)] and positive-definiteness1. The kernel
function K(Wn,Wm) determines the similarity between two Netflow windows Wn and Wm,
each of t seconds. For the definition of the kernel function, two parameters extracted from
the Netflow records are used in the definition of the function.
1A real-valued, continuous differentiable function called f is positively definite in a neighbourhood of the
origin (0, 0) called D, if f(0) = 0 and f(x) > 0 for every non-zero x ∈ D [138]
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The first parameter manages the topological part of the kernel function and uses the IP
address space for source (src) and destination (dst). The IP addresses can be decomposed
into two parts, IPsrc,dst = (prefix, prefixlength). The prefix is the longest common
sequence of bits of two IP-addresses, while the non-matching remaining bits of these IP-
addresses are the prefixlength. The second parameter manages the quantitative part of
the kernel function and holds traffic volume, vol in Bytes. To remind the structure of a
Netflow record, see Figure 4.1.
With these notations, a Netflow record window can be modeled as a set of n Netflow
recordsW = {f1, . . . , fn}, where a record fi is described as a three-tuple fi =(prefix(src,dst)i,
prefixlength(src,dst)i, vol(src,dst)i).
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Figure 4.1: Example of Netflow records
To illustrate what prefix and prefixlength mean, consider the Netflow record example in
Figure 4.2. Comparing the binary form of source IP addresses of the two records,
!"#"$#!$!%&#'(#'(!')%!*&&+*!&,-.&&#+*)#%/)#'')0%(*"&$1&20)!'%)!0)+%(+!/2&&&#!**&&&*#'!*/&&#&
!"#"$#!$!%&#'(#'(!')%+"&&%/'&,-.&&#+*)#%/)%0)#22(*"&$1&20)!'%)'')%#(#!0!&&&*%*%&&&0)*&3&&&&&#&
4567& 86596&
4:95;<=&>&&
.9<6<?<@&
89?A.BCC97DD(.<96& 4D6A.BCC97DD(.<96& .5?E76D&FG67D&H@<ID&
J<=K7D6&?<LL<=&
prefix!
prefixlength!
&&A.&47?ML5@&N<9L & &$1 & & &A.&FM=59G&N<9L&&
#+*)#%/)#'')0% & &$1&&!"""!"!"#!""!""!"#!""!!"!!#"!""!"!" &&
#+*)#%/)%0)#22 && &$1&&!"""!"!"#!""!""!"#""!"!!!!#!!"""!!!$
Figure 4.2: Illustration for parameters prefix and prefixlength
it can be seen that the longest common prefix for the IP addresses is 138.146. This
means both IP addresses have a prefix of 16 bits in common and the remaining 16 bits are
considered as prefixlength.
The kernel function, K(Wn,Wm), aims to detect anomalous traffic patterns by detecting
crucial topological or quantitative changes over time. To achieve this, a similarity function
capturing topological changes and a matching function tracking quantitative changes is in-
troduced. This kernel function produces a similarity score that is the sum over the matching
and similarity functions for source and destination over all Netflow records in a window. A
high similarity score characterizes similar Netflow windows. The kernel function K for two
windows Wn and Wm is defined as,
K(Wn,Wm) =
∑
i∈NWn ,j∈NWm
ssrc,dst(i, j)× vsrc,dst(i, j) (4.1)
with Netflow records denoted NWn and NWm .
The similarity function ssrc,dst(i, j) ∈ [0,∞[ tracks topological network changes and
models the extracted information from IP addresses for source and destination. It can be
defined for flows i and j by,
ssrc,dst(i, j) =

2prefixlength(src,dst)j
2prefixlength(src,dst)i
if prefix(src, dst)i prefix of prefix(src, dst)j
2prefixlength(src,dst)i
2prefixlength(src,dst)j
if prefix(src, dst)j prefix of prefix(src, dst)i
0 otherwise
(4.2)
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The matching function vsrc,dst(i, j) ∈ [0, 1] handles traffic information, expressed in bytes
and is used to track large changes in transfer volumes. The matching function vsrc,dst(i, j)
can be defined by
vsrc,dst(i, j) = exp
(− | vol(src, dst)i − vol(src, dst)j |2
σ2
)
(4.3)
where σ is the width scaling factor for the Gaussian kernel [14, 49] that has been estimated
experimentally (see section 4.4.1).
In order to identify anomalous events, the experiments compared successive windows
K(Wi,Wi+1) with all others to assess their similarities. To illustrate the effectiveness of
the implemented kernel function, a real example is given in Figure 4.3. The representation
shows the similarity values for successive Netflow windows obtained by the kernel function.
No additional tool is used in this case. It can be observed that by tracking pattern changes
in topology and traffic quantities with a kernel function, anomalous network activities can
be detected, as here, a UDP flooding attack between Netflow record window W84 and W86.
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Figure 4.3: Visualizing an attack by using the kernel function
Flooding attacks generate large amounts of traffic and thus can be identified by the use of
the kernel function, but more stealthy attacks probably cannot be detected. To strengthen
the approach presented, a machine learning classification algorithm is applied in order to
classify the similarity values obtained by the kernel function into benign or anomalous traffic
patterns and so, help to identify stealthy attacks.
Since the range of possible network anomalies can include Denial of Service (DoS), Scan-
ning, Botnets, etc., the anomaly class must describe these different kinds of data points. Due
to this, multi-class classifiers do not meet the requirements as they need ground-truth, which
means that they require labelled samples for each expected class of anomaly. Additionally,
this kind of classifier is not able to detect new and unknown anomalies, which are the most
interesting and potentially dangerous phenomena in current networks and the Internet.
Therefore, a very specific kind of algorithm, a one-class classification is used. The aim
is to build a classifier that is able to detect new and unknown anomalies, corresponding
to data points that do not follow a general traffic pattern and that can be used to train
the classifier. More precisely SVMs are used, to achieve high accuracy with low complexity
[152].
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There is a specific one-class method, which was initially proposed in [120], known as
One-class SVM. In this section, OCSVM is combined with the similarity scores from the
kernel function to detect anomalies.
4.2 The classification method
4.2.1 One-class SVM
A major requirement in deploying an OCSVM is to use a data set that represents the single
class of data points. This set is denoted X. In general the problem can be defined as follows:
assuming that points from an original space S follow an underlying probability distribution
P , the goal is to define a subset space of this original space S such that the probability that
a point from P lies outside S is equal to some previously-chosen value between 0 and 1 [120].
This means that during the learning phase, the goal is to determine a function that is
positive when applied to a point from S and negative otherwise. Subsequently, during the
testing phase the sign of this function indicates, whether a point can be classified to the
single class or not.
Assume a labelled sample X = {x1, . . . , xn} with n instances. The objective is to capture
a small region enclosing these points by projecting them into a higher dimensional space,
such that a subset of X can be better separated from the origin. The goal is to determine a
hyper-plane with maximum margin, meaning that the distance to the origin is maximized.
This projection is made using the φ(x)-function and the proportion of points to separate is
defined by 1− ν with ν ∈ [0, 1]. The function can be defined as follows,
minw,ρ,ξi...n
1
2
||w||2 + 1
νn
n∑
i=1
(ξi − ρ) (4.4)
with < w,φ(xi)) > ≥ ρ− ξi, ξi ≥ 0.
The optimization problem must be solved to identify two variables, w and ρ. ξi variables
are slack variables that prevent points of S from being located on the correct side of the
hyper-plane. This avoids problems with erroneous points. Since the definition of a projection
function is not obvious, support vector methods traditionally rely on kernel functions. From
a general point of view, kernel functions can be considered as similarity measures that
respect the properties of finite positive semi-definite functions2 and consequently satisfying
the Mercer condition3. The kernel function K(xi, xj) is equal to < φ(xi),φ(xj) >. Based
on this function and by transforming the problem into its dual form, it can be deduced,
minαi...n
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαjK(xi, xj) (4.5)
with 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1νn ,
∑n
i=1 αi = 1.
Once this optimization problem is solved, the decision function can be defined as
f(x) = sgn(
n∑
i=1
αiK(xi, x)− ρ) (4.6)
This function is applied to each data point that is to be tested. If the sign of the function
is positive, the point belongs to the class; otherwise it is considered as anomalous. In
2In [137, 121, 16] a positive semi-definite function is defined as: A function κ : X ×X → R satisfies the
property, if it is a symmetric function for which the matrices formed by restriction to any finite subset of
the space X are positive semi-definite.
3Mercer’s condition [128]: There exists a mapping function and expansion such that K(x, y) =P
i Φ(x)iΦ(y)i iif ∀g(x) :
R
g(x)2dx is finite such that
R
K(x, y)g(x)g(y)dxdy ≥ 0
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σ K(Tn,Tn+1) σ K(Tn,Tn+1)
0.001 0.0000 10 0.9624
0.100 0.0920 25 0.9856
1.000 0.5168 50 0.9888
5.000 0.8944 100 0.9892
Table 4.1: Illustrating the effect of σ by a grid search
conclusion, it can be said that the main parameter ν represents the maximal proportion
of points in X that are placed on the incorrect side of the hyperplane. The details of this
method are presented in [120, 152].
4.3 The architecture of the anomaly detector
Figure 4.4: Anomaly detector architecture
The Anomaly Detector has three main components. The first module takes the captured
Netflow records and divides them into time windows of t seconds. These Netflow windows
are fed into the kernel function module, which compares successive windows and computes
similarity scores. Here, a preliminary insight into the network activity can be obtained by
representing the similarities scores graphically. In order to improve the evaluation of the
similarity scores, a machine learning module is used. In Figure 4.4, two machine learning
modules are illustrated, but only the supervised version of OCSVM has been evaluated.
4.4 Experimental results
4.4.1 A grid search for σ estimation
In a preliminary experiment, the aim was to study the influence of the σ factor on the
Gaussian kernel function element, vsrc,dst(i, j) = exp
(− |vol(src,dst)i−vol(src,dst)j |2σ2 ).
σ is the width-scaling factor of the function and was estimated by performing a grid
search on the kernel function for values ranging between σ = 0.001, ..., 100.
Table 4.1 shows the outcomes for the best σ values. For values of σ ≤ 1, the impact
on the kernel function is very high, whereas for values of σ ≥ 10 only a low impact on the
kernel function can be observed. This can be explained by the convergence property of the
matching function element vsrc,dst(i, j).
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Type of Attack Results
Accuracy False Positive rate True Negative rate
Nachi scan 0.896 0.004 0.996
NetBIOS scan 0.938 0.000 1.000
Popup spam 0.915 0.023 0.970
Ssh scan + TCP flood 0.917 0.011 0.989
DDoS UDP flood 0.915 0.022 0.978
DDoS TCP flood 0.907 0.033 0.967
Stealthy DDoS UDP flood 0.938 0.000 1.000
DDoS UDP flood + traffic deletion 0.934 0.000 1.000
Table 4.2: Classification results by using OCSVM
4.4.2 OCSVM evaluation
As already stated, anomaly detection is a challenging topic and evaluating innovative solu-
tions is a difficult task due to the lack of freely available and particularly of labelled data
sets. There are some freely available resources such as, as the very well-known Lincoln data
set4, but this is considered to be out-dated nowadays. A recent data set based on Netflow
records is provided in [126], but it contains only attack-related traffic from a honeypot. Fur-
thermore, this kind of architecture collects attack traces from end-user point of view rather
than that of the network.
Therefore, as starting point a real data set provided by a network operator from Lux-
embourg was used. It is assumed that it is free of malicious network activities, because a
secondary semi-automated traffic screening [95] was made with an ISP-specific solution. The
data set is shown in Table A.1 in Annex A. This data set is extended by injecting several
types of attacks in form of Netflow records by using the Flame tool [12]. Both Flame and
the generated attacks are described in Table B.1 in annex B. Flame can inject synthetic
traces into an existing Netflow record data set. The tool includes a set of real attack models,
which was extended to include stealthier attacks, as described in Table B.1. Even though
the duration of the data set is short, it is sufficient for evaluating the approach presented,
since all attacks were limited to last for no more than 30 seconds.
For the experiments, Netflow windows of a duration of 5 seconds were generated. The
kernel function was then applied in order to evaluate the contextual and quantitative infor-
mation of each Netflow record window. Using the kernel function to shape contextual and
quantitative information allows intense attacks to be detected without further processing,
as shown in Figure 4.3. To strengthen the kernel function method and to detect stealthy
attacks, the OCSVM algorithm has been applied to these similarity values to determine
whether or not, the method is able to detect the attacks. 20% of the Netflow record win-
dows were used to train the OCSVM classifier, while the remaining 80% of the data set were
used for the testing phase. The outcomes of the experiments are presented in Table 4.2.
The results of applying OCSVM are very promising and it can be observed that the false
positive rates are very low, except for some types of attack. A possible explanation for this
can be that the method is not well-suited for this kind of attack. What is more, the overall
average classification accuracy for all attack classes is around 0.92.
4http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/ist/index.html
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4.5 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has summarized the work that in [144]. A new approach for the evaluation of
sequences of Netflow record windows is presented. To validate the approach, several types
of synthetic attacks were added to the data set using the tool Flame.
The first contribution consists in the evaluation of Netflow records by analyzing their
quantitative and contextual information through the introduction of a new kernel function
that calculates the similarities between Netflow windows.
Secondly, a SVM algorithm was applied to the output of the kernel function in order to
detect attacks in data sets. The classification results are very promising, with most attacks
being identified.
From the point of view of performance, it must be stated that it is impossible to use this
algorithm in near real-time. This is because it requires that n Netflow windows are compared
with each other, so with a window of size m flows, complexity easily reaches O(n2), as each
Netflow record must be compared to all the other Netflow records in successive windows.
Consequently, a large m per window results in longer runtimes. In practice this means that,
for the small ISP data set, n = 150 Netflow windows having on average m = 9, 000 flows
per window must be compared to each other with the result that 1010 operations are carried
out. Runtime can be reduced by varying the Netflow window size and by this the number
of Netflow records in the window.
To lower the runtime (in the sense of operations to calculate), sampling methods like
presented in [36] or [101] can be used. The identification of effective sampling rates remains
an open issue. Another possibility is to apply aggregation, where Netflow records are aggre-
gated over space and time in order to reduce storage problems and complexity while losing
only a small amount of data.
The following chapter, presents a spatio-temporal aggregation technique for Netflow
records, which allows the task of processing Netflow records to be accomplished more quickly.
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Chapter 5
Spatio-temporal aggregation for
Netflow records
Aggregation-based anomaly detection
The analysis of time-windowed Netflow records has shown that, while kernel function eval-
uation provides good detection results, it needs long run-times. Sampling or compression
could decrease run times by reducing the quantity of Netflow records that are analyzed. An
additional argument in favour of compression, is the storage requirement for logging every
Netflow record. The question for this chapter is: can anomalies be detected by combining
the kernel function approach with a tree-like compression representation for the Netflow
data?
This chapter addresses this problem and proposes a compression technique that is able
to track topological and quantitative changes producing a tree-like representation with min-
imal data loss. To evaluate the aggregated data, the kernel function for Netflow records
introduced in Chapter 4 is extended so that it can be applied to the new data format.
5.1 Tree-like Netflow aggregation in space and time
Analyzing every Netflow record is a time-consuming task that only works in a delimited
framework, as shown in the previous chapter. In this chapter, a tree-like aggregation ap-
proach is presented for the processing of Netflow records. Spatial and temporal aggregation
of IP related data was first presented in [20, 68] for full-packet captures and was applied to
Netflow records in [144, 45].
The task of spatial aggregation is performed by extracting host IP address information
(for source or destination) and aggregating volume information from Netflow records (mea-
sured as proportion of bytes/packets). This information is then spatially aggregated and
results stored in tree-like traffic profiles. A graphical illustration is given in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of spatio-temporal aggregation
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In a traffic profile, a node represents an IP subnet, which can also be a single address,
with the corresponding volume (excluding volume from child subnets), voli. The volume for
a node is expressed as a proportion of the total volume. For example, assume #bytesi is the
number of bytes corresponding to node i, then the volume for a node i can be expressed as,
voli =
#bytesi∑
j #bytesj
An aggregation threshold α is applied and nodes with voli ≥ α are stored, while the
volumes the others are added into their parents. The IP address information is decomposed
into prefixi and those of prefix lengthi (see section 4.1). Thus, the tree structure respects
the hierarchy of the IP address space. Clear advantages of this aggregation method firstly
are that a traffic overview on a subnet level can be represented and second, data can be
stored in compact traffic profiles.
When a new Netflow record is analyzed, the process matches source or destination IP
address with the most similar node ipsim, which is the one that shares the longest common
IP prefix. This step is accomplished by a pre-order traversal of the tree. If a match is found,
the corresponding volume (voli) is updated. Otherwise, a new node is created, together with
a new branching point between the parent of this new node and the last visited unmatched
node.To do this, Patricia trees [92], full binary Radix trees with a fixed tree size (NMAX
nodes) are used. Each time a new node is needed, the least recently used (LRU), node not
having an associated volume higher than α, is reclaimed. An advantage of Patricia trees
is that memory use and search time for variable-length keys are bounded. At the end of
each time window, the tree is processed in post order to aggregate nodes with voli < α
into their parents, which represent IP subnets with shorter prefix lengths. This description
omits details, since the process is similar to that described in [68, 20]. The approximation
of using an LRU algorithm is managed in O(1) and does as established in [68, 20] not have
a significant impact on the aggregation quality. To complete the definition of a spatial
aggregation tree T , a traffic profile can be described as follows:
• A set of N nodes, where T = {n1, ..., nN} and ni =< prefixi, prefix lengthi, voli >
• A relation, called child, where child : T → P(T ), returning the set of child nodes for
a given node1
Temporal aggregation consists of a sequence of traffic profiles over time:
{< T src,byt1 , T dst,byt1 , T src,pkt1 , T dst,pkt1 >, . . . , < T src,bytM , T dst,bytM , T src,pktM , T dst,pktM >}
where T src,byti is the spatial traffic profile within a time window i source IP address-
based, and T dst,byti the traffic profile for destination information. Both are based on volume
in bytes. For temporal aggregation, a time parameter is introduced to set time window sizes
(β in seconds). If packets, rather than flows are to be evaluated, the notations should be
adjusted to T src,pkti and T
dst,pkt
i .
This chapter is focussed on anomaly detection, where the aim is to track traffic changes
in traffic profiles by controlling the granularity α. The higher this threshold is set, the
more Netflow records are aggregated into larger profiles, producing a coarse-grained view of
traffic, whereas a small aggregation threshold provides fine-grained traffic views. In the case
of anomaly detection, spatial aggregation is very useful for discarding small proportions
of traffic that may be highly variable and particular for numerous end hosts. Temporal
aggregation is applied to avoid distraction resulting from irrelevant concentrated short-term
peak traffic patterns.
1a power set P(T ) is the set of all subsets of T
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Figure 5.2: Text output of aggregated destination traffic profile
5.2 The model for spatio-temporal aggregation
5.2.1 A kernel function for spatio-temporal aggregation
The kernel function designed for the traffic profiles is similar to that presented for simple
Netflow records in Chapter 4. The main difference is that aggregated traffic profiles for
source and destination are used as input. The metrics for the kernel function namely the
source or destination IP addresses and volume information can be extracted from the traffic
profiles. Figure 5.1 illustrates metrics voli, prefixi and prefixlengthi (see section 5.1).
Similarity (ssrc,dst) and matching (vsrc,dst) functions are reused from Section 4.1.
The kernel function for source and destination Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tm) for profile tree Tn and
Tm with the set of nodes NTn and NTm can be defined as follows,
Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tm) =
∑
i∈NTn ,j∈NTm
ssrc,dst(i, j)× vsrc,dst(i, j) (5.1)
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Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of the kernel function on traffic proles
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To recall, the difference between the kernel function modelling here, and the kernel
function presented in Chapter 4 mainly is the input that has changed. In Chapter 4, time
window-based Netflow records were used. Here, Netflow records aggregated into traffic
profiles are used, but the kernel metrics have not changed. Figure 5.3 illustrates, the process
for the kernel function that is applied to the traffic profiles.
5.2.2 The architecture
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Figure 5.4: The architecture of the prototype
The general architecture is composed of three main modules. The first module, Ag-
gregator, takes the captured Netflow records from a database and processes them into the
spatially-aggregated shape. The aggregation task is performed by Aguri [20, 68], which
implements aggregation-based traffic profiling. The original implementation of Aguri only
supported full-packet captures, not the direct import of Netflow records, so it was necessary
to extend it by implementing a custom import interface for Netflow records.
A traffic profile summarizes flow records for a period s of η seconds by spatially aggre-
gating subnets with their hosts and activities, with η being defined by the network operator.
An aggregation threshold t is fixed in order to adjust the level of aggregation. Aguri outputs
four distinct traffic profiles. source and destination IP addresses and source and destination
ports/protocols. Only the source and destination profiles for IP addresses are used in this
thesis. A generated Aguri profile looks similar to Figure 5.2.
In Figure 5.4 the architecture of the proof-of-concept is shown: (1) Netflow records are
used as input and the tree-like traffic profiles are generated as output. The kernel function
module uses successive traffic profiles for comparison and computes a similarity value for
these profiles. These kernel values can either be stored in a database (3) or immediately
used for further processing, for example in this thesis to use classification, statistics, game
theory, etc. Another possibility is to store the kernel values in a database (3) and process
them later only (4).
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5.3 Summary
The work presented in this chapter has previously been published in [148, 150, 151]. This
chapter presented a new evaluation approach for Netflow record analysis that applies spatio-
temporal aggregation. A major advantage of using aggregation trees is that the lookup
operation when having N nodes runs in O(logN), while management2 of the list runs in
O(1). This allows the traffic aggregation method to be used in near real time [68, 20]. In the
following chapters, this aggregation model will be applied to different methods for anomaly
detection.
The kernel function discussed in the previous chapter has been extended to compute
similarities between tree-like traffic structures for destination and source information in
order to detect anomalies. From a runtime perspective this approach performs faster than
the method presented in Chapter 4, as data is now aggregated and reducing the quantity
of data to be processed. Additionally, the complexity of the new approach is at O(n2). In
the data used for the experiment, the traffic profile has a constant size of 42 nodes that
must be compared to each other within successive traffic profiles. This means while having
n = 150 traffic profiles withm = 42 nodes, one requires 105 operations with the new method.
Compared to the Netflow record windows approach (1010 operations), the new method is
much more efficient in terms of run time.
To complement and assist the work set out in this chapter, a visualization module,
PeekKernelFlows, was implemented. This tool enables a network operator to visualize
network attacks and anomalies by using a mapping of kernel similarity values into the
RGB3 color space such that outliers and anomalies can easily be seen. A short description
of PeeKernelFlows is given in Appendix C.
2insert, delete and update operations
3RGB: Red-Blue -Green color space
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Chapter 6
A game for aggregated Netflow
records
This chapter presents a somewhat other perspective to anomaly detection in Netflow records.
The methods presented so far assume that a malicious entity is not aware of the network
security mechanisms that are in place. This chapter addresses the problem where each
entity has full knowledge about the other. This means that an attacker exactly knows which
security mechanisms are being used and the network operator knows about the attacks being
used. Additionally each party is has full knowledge about the other party’s knowledge.
This chapter models a game that is able to define the best strategy for an attacker
launching an attack against a network while exactly knowing its defence mechanisms, but
at the same time defining the best defending strategy for a network operator. To model this
strategic game for the kernel function based evaluation of aggregated Netflows, game-theory
is applied.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold,
• The kernel function based model for evaluating Netflow records within
• a game-theoretical model that embodies the definition of a set of actions for attackers
and defender
One application domain of game theory is the use of strategic games, for example the
Nash Equilibrium [94]. The Nash Equilibrium represents a concept of a game that involves
two to n players and aims to compute the optimal strategy profile for each player. If a
player cannot obtain a higher payoff by deviating his profile unilaterally, this set of actions
and payoffs constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. A well-known example for a Nash Equilibrium
is the prisoner’s dilemma [110, 5]. The prisoner’s dilemma can be explained as follows: two
people are arrested, but it cannot be proven who is guilty. The two are separated with no
possibility of communication and the police officer offers both the same deal,
• If one prisoner incriminates the other and the other remains silent, then the defecting
prisoner is released while the other gets one year of prison
• If both remain silent, then both get one month of prison
• If both incriminate each other, then both get three months of prison
In this situation, the prisoners must optimize their choice and cannot cheat. Table 6.1
illustrates the choices and its related consequences. A prisoner can choose one of the two
strategies to play, but the rational consequence, the time to spent in prison varies greatly.
For example, if prisoner 1 remains silent and the prisoner 2 defects, then prisoner 1 is
imprisoned for a year while prisoner 2 is freed, but if both prisoners defect then the time in
prison for each is only three months.
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Prisoner 2 is silent Prisoner 2 defects
Prisoner 1 is silent 1 month each Prisoner 1: 1 year
Prisoner 2: free
Prisoner 1 defects Prisoner 1: free 3 months each
Prisoner 2: 1 year
Table 6.1: Prisoner’s dilemma matrix
The optimal solution for both prisoners is to remain silent, but this case is not stable,
because one prisoner can take benefit from this situation by defecting, so condemning the
other to a year in prison. The only stable solution in this case for both prisoners to defect,
because neither can take advantage in this situation. This is known as a Nash Equilibrium,
even though the jail time for both prisoners is not minimized.
6.1 Game-theoretical modeling for spatially aggregated
Netflow records
In this thesis, the Nash Equilibrium is used for the evaluation of different attacks and their
respective defence strategies in network monitoring analysis. In this framework, a game
between an attacker and a network operator is modeled. The different definitions and
notations are taken from [53]. A game can be formally defined as follows,
Let the game be a 3-tuple Γ = (N , (Ai, Ri)1≤i≤n) between network operator and
attacker, where N is a set of n players, Ai is a finite strategy set (ai ∈ An) and Ri:
A → R is a payoff function, with A = A1 × · · ·×An.
In general, a Nash Equilibrium leads to either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. A
pure strategy can be explained as a set of actions reflecting a complete definition of a player’s
game, showing what moves a player can make in any situation. In a mixed strategy, players
use a probability distribution over a set of possible actions. This means that a random
choice is made between strategies in order to avoid being exploited by the adversary. A
good example of a mixed strategy is the Rock-Paper-Scissors game [42], because there is no
pure strategy for that game, as moves are unpredictable. In this case, a good strategy is to
switch between strategies in order to avoid being exploited by the adversary. Nash showed
in his work [94]1 that at least one mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in any game with
a finite set of actions, including zero-sum games.
According to [53], the set of probability distributions over a strategy set Ai is a mixed
strategy set for a player i,
∆(Ai) =
{
qi : Ai → [0, 1] |
∑
ai∈Ai
qi(ai) = 1
}
(6.1)
where ∆(Ai) ≡ Qi, Q =
∏
iQi. The expected payoffs for a player i from a strategy profile
q are
Ea∼q =
∑
a∈A
q(a)Ri(a), (6.2)
such that q(a) =
∏N
i=1 qj(aj) iff a Nash Equilibrium results from ∀qi ∈ Qi, E[Ri(q∗i , q−i)] ≥
E[Ri(qi, q−i)]. In the context of the approach presented, a Nash equilibrium means that
neither the network operator nor the attacker can increase their expected payoff, while
it has been assumed that neither player changes the strategy during the game.
1http://www.jstor.org/stable/1969529, last accessed 02/01/2012
A game for aggregated Netflow records 51
6.2 Attack and defence measures
6.2.1 Defensive measures
From a defensive perspective, the goal is to monitor the sequence of values K(Tn, Tn+1)
(denotes the kernel function for traffic profiles of Netflow records, as defined in Chapter 5.2)
and decide if at a moment n an anomaly or an attack is present. Most existing approaches are
based on identifying outliers or trends in time series and leverage threshold-based methods.
Several approaches are analyzed which can be leveraged in our framework:
• The network operator manually defines a threshold that computes the mean µ of
observed normal traffic when no attack is taking place. If the kernel value for an
Aguri profile
K(Tn, Tn+1) ≥ µ (6.3)
then this profile is declared as an incident.
• The network operator defines a threshold (βσ) based on the Chebychev’s inequality2,
where
|K(Tn, Tn+1)− µ| ≥ βσ (6.4)
with β a real number, µ being the mean value and σ the standard deviation. A value
exceeding this threshold is considered to indictate an incident.
• The network operator sets a threshold θ which is the maximal observed value of
K(Tn, Tn+1) for normal profiles. This is defined as,
θ = max
(
K(T1, T1+1, ...,K(Tn, Tn+1)
)
(6.5)
If a new K(Tn, Tn+1) ≥ θ then this event is declared as an incident.
• The network operator defines the threshold by using an Exponential Weighted Moving
Average (EWMA) [18] that applies exponentially decreasing weighting factors.
EWMAn =
(
K(Tn−1, Tn)− EWMATn−1
)
× α+ EWMATn−1 (6.6)
with α= 2P+1 and P is the number of Aguri profiles. If K(Tn, Tn+1) ≥ EWMAn then
there is an incident.
6.2.2 Attack measures
An attacker has two main choices. He can first decide when to attack, that is the time interval
during which the attack will be launched. Once this decision has been made, he can apply
the chosen attack method. It is assumed that the first choice can be made in two modes. The
simplest mode corresponds to a memoryless and random attacker. Formally, this is modelled
by a binomial probability distribution function, where p is the attack probability and q the
non-attack probability, with p+q = 1. An advanced attacker can use a more complex model,
where the choice is dependent on the immediate past. Such an attacker is modelled using a
Markov chain [84]. This Markov chain model has a finite set of states S = {A,N}, with A
being an attack state and N a non-attacking state. The transition probabilities are defined
as p(A → A) = p being the probability of staying in the attacking state A, p(N → N) = q
the probability of remaining in in state N , the transition probabilities p(N → A) = 1 − q
for moving from N to A and p(A → N) = 1 − p the transition probability of moving from
A to N (see Fig. 6.1). This model starts in state N , because it is assumed that the first
Aguri profile corresponds to normal network operation.
2From [54]: Chebychev’s inequality for a random variable (X) with a finite expected value (µ) and a
non-zero variance (σ2) can be defined for a real number k with k > 0 as Pr(|X − µ| ≥ kσ) ≤ 1
k2
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Figure 6.1: The Markov model transition diagram
The attacker can choose between several attacks. This thesis mainly considers attacks
based on the injection of additional nodes and traffic (see section 6.3.1) into the network.
Such attacks encompass distributed denial-of-service (increase in services, e.g. nodes and
traffic), illegal repository (increase in traffic volume) or backdoors (new nodes and traffic).
These attacks can be directly performed, with an attacker steadily injecting services into
the network over a single time-slot, repeating this behaviour only a few times. In a more
stealthy attack, an attacker continuously adds new services and/or traffic volume to the
network over time, such that both of network size and traffic grow constantly. Such an
approach is useful for deceiving anomaly-based monitoring approaches tuned only to detect
sudden changes.
6.2.3 Modelling of actions and computation of payoffs
In this game, an attacker wants to find the optimal attack probabilities in order to remain
undetected while running her attack. The game model can be defined as follows: The game
has two players, N = {network operator, attacker}. Additionally, it is assumed that all
network operators act as a single collective player and all attackers act as a single collec-
tive player. The set A1 corresponds to the actions of the attacker and A2 to the network
operator ’s actions.
The attack strategy is defined as a set of actions A1 = {a1,0, . . . , a1,3}, where
• a1,0: binomial distribution with a simple injection scheme — an attacker injects a
number of services into the network in one time-slot.
• a1,1: binomial distribution with a stealth method — an attacker continuously adds
services over a period of time.
• a1,2: Markov Model with a simple injection scheme — an attacker injects a number of
services into the network in one time-slot.
• a1,3: Markov Model with a stealth method — an attacker continuously adds services
over a period of time.
The defence strategy for a network operator can be defined as a set of actions A2 =
{a2,0, . . . , a2,3}, where
• a2,0: The network operator uses a threshold µ computed from observed normal traffic.
• a2,1: The network operator applies the Chebychev inequality.
• a2,2: The network operator sets a threshold that is the maximal observed value
K(Ti, Ti+1) without attacks.
• a2,3: The network operator applies the EWMA method.
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A payoff should model each player’s gain as faithfully as possible. This means that a
network operator requires measures for the sensitivity (ssen) and the specificity (sspec) of
the detection method. Sensitivity, also known as recall rate, is given by
ssen =
correctly identified attacks
all identified attacks
(6.7)
while specificity is a measure for the correctly identified negatives given by
sspec =
correctly identified attacks
all correctly identified attacks
(6.8)
Thus, the payoff function for the network operator is,
pn =
ssen + sspec
2
(6.9)
For the attacker, the payoff measures the time intervals that were not properly classified by
the network operator’s detection method, with
pa = 1− pn = 1− ssen + sspec2 (6.10)
6.3 Experimental results
6.3.1 Injection attacks
This subsection describes how quantitative measurements were made in order to study the
similarity of traffic profiles (of the ISP data set) by using the kernel function (see Appendix
A.2). The sensitivity of this method was studied by injecting events that imply changes in
the traffic matrix, like the appearance of new services in a network (while keeping the overall
traffic volume constant) or spontaneous traffic volume changes (while keeping the number
of services constant). Since the similarity function takes both the topology and the labelling
of the underlying aggregated traffic profiles into account, the analysis examined how traffic
changes impacted this metric.
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Figure 6.2: Visualization of a service injection attack vs. normal traffic
The first experiment simulated an injection attack. The intention was to show the
impact on K(Tn, Tn+1) of injecting new services into source traffic profiles by increasing
the number of services in the profile, but without changing the traffic load in the network.
To achieve this, a traffic profile was modified by adding n services (nodes). In Figure 6.2,
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Figure 6.3: Injection of a constant number machines over 30 seconds
the K(Tn, Tn+1) values for normal traffic profiles and the same profiles augmented by the
injection of 10 services are highlighted.
The second experiment simulated a stealth injection attack . An attacker injects services
over a number of profiles in the hope of remaining undetected. Starting in profile 20,
an attacker injects 20 new services over a time period of 5 profiles (see Figure 6.3 for
different σ-values, σ = {0.1, 1, 5}). It can be seen that the kernel function is able to detect
stealthy incidents, since the stealthy injection provokes a peak throughout the injection
period, whatever the value of σ.
6.4 Game-theoretical evaluation
This section presents the evaluation of the application of a game-theoretical model for injec-
tion attack/response simulations in order to determine optimal strategies for both attacker
and network operator. Several scenarios were generated, using both binomial and Marko-
vian distributions, but only one scenario for each distribution is presented in this section to
illustrate the outcomes for this approach.
The binomial strategy used a probability of p = 0.4 to simulate stealth and injection
attacks, the Markovian strategy used probabilities of p = 0.4 and q = 0.6 for its simulation
of the injection and stealth attacks. The defence strategy used experimentally-estimated
threshold values as defined in the action set A2 = {a2,0, . . . , a2,3}.
Payoff values for attacker pa and network pn
a2,0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3
pn pa pn pa pn pa pn pa
a1,0 0.58 0.15 0.71 0.29 0.41 0.59 0.72 0.28
a1,1 0.71 0.29 0.72 0.28 0.57 0.43 0.65 0.34
a1,2 0.71 0.29 0.65 0.35 0.81 0.19 0.80 0.19
a1,3 0.71 0.28 0.85 0.15 0.58 0.41 0.71 0.29
Table 6.2: Payoffs for attacker pa and network operator pn
The payoff results for attacker and network operator are given in Table 9.1. The Nash
Equilibrium was estimated by using a game-theory tool, Gambit [136]. A mixed-strategy
equilibrium was obtained (see Table 9.2) by playing the different games. It can be seen
that the probabilities for the different attack strategies vary, and similar observations can
be made for the network operator. The best strategy for an attacker would be to apply the
Markovian distribution scenario while performing a simple injection attack (a1,2), because
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this scenario reached a probability of 0.63. From the network operator’s point of view, a
good strategy would be to apply the simple mean (µ) threshold (a2,0) strategy for network
monitoring, as this scenario reached a probability of 0.53.
Attacker Network operator
a1,0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 a2,0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3
0.04 0 0.63 0.33 0.53 0.24 0.23 0
Table 6.3: Results for Nash Equilibrium
A major assumption for regular finite games, such as the previous experiment, is that
all players are rational. This means that each player wants to optimize its received payoff.
However, players may make ill-judged decisions by selecting ‘bad’ strategies; alternatively
they may take decisions they consider to be ‘good’, despite theory showing that another
strategy is ‘optimal’. To investigate the effectiveness of the different strategies for each
player from the previous experiment, a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) analysis was
performed. [87] introduces a precision factor λ to represent imperfections in payoffs. The
QRE can be derived from a log-Weibull distribution, is a probability distribution for a failure
occurrence time. Failures that is, poor decisions by a player, are described by the factor λ,
which is inversely related to the level of error. This means that if λ = 0 , all actions are
erroneous, whileλ =∞ signifies no errors.
The QRE can be defined as
piij =
eλxij∑Ai
k=1 e
λxij
(6.11)
with xij being the expected payoff for player i using strategy j and piij the probability of
selecting a particular action [135]. The outcome of the QRE analysis is represented in Figure
9.3. The y-axis describes the probabilities of selecting a strategy and the x-axis represents
a grid search for λ.
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Figure 6.4: Quantal response equilibrium evaluation
Setting λ = 0 results in an equal distribution of strategies, meaning that a probability
of 0.25 is given to each strategy. Increasing λ makes the obtained value tend towards the
obtained Nash Equilibrium value (see Table 9.2 and Figure 9.3) and stabilizes. Additionally,
it can also be observed that, as more bad decisions are made, the attacker strategy converges
faster than the network operator strategy.
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6.5 Summary
The work presented in this chapter was initially published in [147]. This chapter has applied
game-theory to aggregated Netflow record profiles in order to use the kernel function to
identify good attack and defence strategies for attacker and network administrators.
An advantage of the game-theoretic approach is that each party to a game has full
knowledge about the other party’ knowledge and all parties know that the other party has
full knowledge about the own knowledge. In a preliminary experiment, it was shown that
the kernel function for aggregated Netflow records is able to track both flooding and more
stealthy attacks.
The Nash Equilibrium was used to model the game for the attacking and defending
parties. A set of actions for attacker and defender were defined and the Nash Equilibrium
applied to them in order to determine the best strategies for attacker and defender. Several
approaches were tested and evaluated for the definition of the set of actions in the game. For
the attacker actions, different attack schemes were evaluated to identify the most profitable
solutions. The evaluation of the game model showed no pure strategy exists for the attacker
or defender, as the Nash Equilibrium was mixed. To strengthen and evaluate the efficiency
of this result, a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) was performed by adding an error value
to the payoff function. This simulation confirmed the outcomes of the Nash Equilibrium.
The game-theoretic approach presented shows some limits. A reasonable approach would
be not to use collective players. Collective players act by following a defined set of actions,
whereas in network security, both attacker and defender can take a wide variety of possible
actions. This chapter has used, only a restricted set of actions has been used to model the
game, even though, in reality, many other actions are available to each party. The model
does not use learning games; players’ knowledge is not increased as the game progresses.
Another limitation is the used of fixed payoffs, because a payoff should principally reflect
the motivation of players and model the profit for each player.
Chapter 7
Reconstructing missing
dimensions in aggregated
Netflow records
DANAK: Finding the odd!
Previous chapters have analyzed anomalies in successive traffic profiles in a time series:
ordered sequences of traffic profiles were analyzed at equally-paced time intervals1. Figure
7.1 represents the visualization of a time series with n traffic profiles into which a violent
DDoS UDP flood attack has been injected between traffic profile 60 to 120. By evaluating
this time series with the kernel function set out in Chapter 5.2.1, this strong attack can be
detected and visualized in this graphical representation (annotated in Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1: Kernel function evaluation for a violent DDoS UDP flood attack
In Figure 7.2 on the following page, a stealthy DDoS flood attack has been injected
into the same time series and evaluated with the kernel function. This time, it can be seen
that the kernel function is not sufficient to identify the anomaly, with the result that the
graphical representation is unable to reveal it to a human expert.
1Definition of Time Series: An ordered sequence of values of a variable at equally spaced time intervals
[96]
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Figure 7.2: Kernel function evaluation for a stealthy DDoS UDP flood attack
Network workload changes or other disturbances impact network monitoring and report-
ing, such that large data sets may include periods where data is sparse or even completely
absent. This had a major influence on the evaluation of the traffic time series. This chapter
introduces DANAK (Detecting Anomalies in Netflow records by spatial Aggregation and
Kernel methods), a new model that applies an accurate method for the embedding of time
series into a n-dimensional space to reconstruct missing dimensions in traffic profiles. The
model is evaluated by using a classifier in order to separate attacks from benign traffic. The
contribution of this chapter is two-fold:
• A phase space embedding model for traffic profiles is introduced
• Evaluation of model by use of a classifier to detect anomalies
7.1 The model for DANAK
7.1.1 The kernel function for traffic profiles
In a first step, the kernel function of Chapter 5.2.1 is slightly extended by introducing
a weight parameter for DANAK. The kernel function is calculated for input profiles by
counting the number of common nodes and not by performing an exhaustive computation
over the entire space for source and destination. The similarity and the matching function
part (ssrc,dst(i, j), vsrc,dst(i, j)) remain as defined in Chapter 5.2.1. For two traffic profiles
denoted Tn =< T srcn , T dstn > and Tm =< T srcm , T dstm > (see details in section 5.2.1), the
output of the extended kernel function K(Tn, Tm) gives a similarity score over source and
destination in only one function and can be defined as
Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tm) =
1
2
∑
i∈T src,dstn ,j∈T src,dstm
ssrc,dst(i, j)× vsrc,dst(i, j) (7.1)
The output of the kernel function is used for the embedding and in the Phase Space analysis
that is presented in the following section. The weighting of kernel function does not have an
influence on the kernel function per se, but has been introduced for representation purposes,
such that graph values become more readable.
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7.1.2 The phase space method with delayed coordinates
This section presents the phase space embedding of time series for nonlinear systems. Time-
delay reconstructions of a phase space are an accepted technique for viewing the dynamics
in a system, as presented in [159, 130, 81, 72, 118]. Phase space analysis with delayed co-
ordinates allows the reconstruction of missing dimensions by using preceding and delayed
information (function values) as additional coordinates [130, 81, 159]. So enabling explo-
ration of historical profile knowledge (including missing dimensions). Takens embedding
theorem2 [130] is used to apply time-delayed observed scalars as coordinates in the phase
space, according to x(t0 + n∆t) = x(n) [72]. Multivariate vectors in d-dimensional recon-
struction space are used to trace the system orbit such that, with T being the time delay,
y(n) = (x(n), x(n+ T ), ...x(n+ (d− 1)T ) (7.2)
with the time evolution of y denoted as y(n)→ y(n+ 1) (see [130, 72]).
In this section, the time series resulting from the traffic profiling is modelled to allow
the reconstruction of missing dimensions by using delayed coordinates. These traffic profiles
summarize network activity for time intervals of η seconds. The modeling applies the model
used in [159]. Here, Phase Space Analysis is applied to network-based sequence number
generator quality in a system representing an n-dimensional space that fully describes a n-
variable system. [159] uses a three-dimensional representation of one-dimensional data that
is generated by calculating the first-order differences between traffic profiles. The obtained
delayed coordinates are also known as function attractors [81]. Referring to [159], the model
for the Phase Space Analysis with delayed coordinates for traffic profiles can be defined as
follows:
Taking an input set s, and x, y, z as the point coordinates, the equation for a sample n
can be defined as,
x[n] = s[n− 2]− s[n− 3] (7.3)
y[n] = s[n− 1]− s[n− 2] (7.4)
z[n] = s[n]− s[n− 1] (7.5)
where s[n] = Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tn−1). To model traffic profiles in this space, the first-order differ-
ence equations are applied to preceding, delayed and actual traffic profiles kernel function
values in order to obtain an accurate and extended view on the evolution of the network
topology and its related traffic. Unlike direct historical comparisons of one sample with
prior ones, this allows the dynamism of changes to be captured. The results obtained from
the phase space analysis are used in the classification task to detect anomalies.
In the introduction it was shown that the simple use of kernel functions can fail in
the identification of anomalous network behaviour, for example, with stealthy attacks (see
Figure 7.2) or in sparse data sets. Therefore, phase space embedding was applied to build
historical profile knowledge (including missing dimensions).
An example showing a stealthy DDoS UDP Flooding attack in its traffic profiles is given
in Figure 7.3. The Figure is a 3-dimensional graph that includes a simple history of actual
traffic profiles Ti (expressed in kernel values) compared to the three preceding traffic profiles
Ti−1, Ti−2 and Ti−3.
2A summary of Takens’ Theorem is given in [123]: Given a continuous time dynamical system with a
compact invariant smooth manifold A , s.t. A,
• is of dimension dA
• has a finite number of equilibria
• has no periodic orbits of period Td or 2Td
• has only a finite number of periodic orbits of period pTd, 3 ≤ p ≤ m and those have distinct eigenvalues
• then there exists a delay coordinate function H which is a differentiable embedding from A to H(A)
for k > 2dA
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Figure 7.3: Stealthy DDoS UDP flood attack without phase space embedding analysis
The attack remains undetected in this representation, as the data points corresponding
to the anomaly and to the benign traffic are not separable using the kernel function value
history.
Figure 7.4 shows the same stealthy DDoS UDP flood attack, but this time when phase
space embedding is used. The axis in the graph represent: the x, y, z -coordinates obtained
by applying the first-order difference equations, presented in section 7.1.2.
Figure 7.4: DDoS UDP flood attack with phase space embedding analysis
Comparing the two figures (Figure 7.3 and 7.4), shows that the anomalies can be visu-
alized by applying Phase Space Analysis. In Figure 7.4, anomalies are now largely grouped
in one part of the figure and disjoint to normal profiles. This demonstrates that combining
kernel functions and phase space analysis, different types of attacks can be visually detected.
However, to strengthen the validation of the approach presented, a classification algorithm
that uses these three-dimensional features in order to identify anomalous and benign network
activities is required.
7.1.3 The classification algorithm
The CART (Classification And Regression Trees) algorithm [13] is used to classify the three-
dimensional features generated by the phase space embedding. CART algorithm is a super-
vised learning algorithm. The difference between classification and regression tree analysis
is that, in classification tree analysis, the outcome is usually a prediction of membership of
a class, whereas in regression tree analysis the outcome is a prediction of a real number.
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Referring to the description in [13], the CART algorithm methodology can be divided
into three steps,
• Building decision tree
• Pruning
• Classifying new instances
This paragraph briefly describes the CART algorithm, for a more detailed description, the
reader is referred to [13, 124]. The algorithm generates its binary decision tree by applying
recursive splitting on the sample space, using sample impurity to estimate the split threshold
from the set until the stopping condition is reached. This impurity index, known as the Gini
index, identifies the largest data class in a sample set and isolates it. A common problem in
decision trees is that they are overfitted and complex. Therefore, pruning is performed in
order to calibrate the decision tree and build an optimal tree. One common pruning method
is minimal cost pruning, which is based on the estimation of the optimal balance between
tree complexity and misclassification errors/costs.
In this work, the CART algorithm is applied to the phase space embedding results
obtained with the kernel function values Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tm). The aim of using the algorithm
is to create a simple two-class classifier which is able to distinguish attacks/anomalies from
benign traffic profiles.
7.1.4 The architecture of DANAK
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Figure 7.5: General view of the DANAK architecture
Figure 7.1.4 shows a general overview of the architecture of DANAK. The S-Aggregation
processes Netflow records, aggregating them as shown in Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5, to generate
traffic profiles for source and destination information. PS-Embedding and Kernel Function
calculus are performed, representing the main component of DANAK. This method refines
the kernel values for profiles by leveraging historical knowledge by means of phase space em-
bedding. The results are passed to the classifier, which applies a machine learning algorithm,
with the aim of classifying the values into anomalous or conventional traffic.
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7.2 Experimental results
The ISP operator data set described in Appendix A, Table A.1, was used for the experiments.
The parameters for the aggregation module were set to α = 5% for the aggregation threshold,
such that a fine profile granularity is preserved and only small Netflow record information
omitted. The capture time for a Netflow record windows was set to η = 5 seconds.
To validate the DANAK monitoring framework, the Netflow data set was been extended
by injecting synthetic attack traces into real traces using Flame [12]. A description of the
Flame tool is given in Appendix B. The injected attacks were limited to time periods of
five minutes; a shorter would not allow evaluation of attack detection in the face of varying
background traffic. An overview of the implemented synthetic attacks and their description
can be found in Appendix B.2, list B.1.
Classification results
The open-source WEKA machine learning tool [56], version 3.6.43 was used for the classifica-
tion task. This tool implements a collection of machine learning algorithms (both supervised
and unsupervised) for use in real scenarios.
The SimpleCART algorithm was used to evaluate the Phase Space Analysis with the
kernel function values obtained by the traffic profile processing. WEKA’s SimpleCART
implements a minimal-cost pruning method [13]. A cross-validation parameter of 5 folds
was set to fine-tune the experiments. Cross-validation is the equivalent of dividing the data
set into n equally sized sub sets (in this case n = 5). A decision tree was generated using four
of the five subsets, then the remaining subset was classified using this tree. The procedure
was repeated for each of the five possible groups of four subsets, and the overall average
classification performance calculated. Each kind of injected attack was evaluated with the
SimpleCART algorithm. Table 7.1 summarizes the classifier results giving the true-positive
and the false-positive rate for each attack. Finally, it is important to note that, while it was
assumed that the data set was free of malicious traffic, there is no ground truth. Hence,
some results classified as false-positives may actually be real attacks in the original data
set. It can be observed that this classifier can accurately detect the various attacks injected
Type of attack Results
True Positive Rate False Positive Rate
Nachi scan 0.912 0.222
NetBIOS scan 0.941 0.185
Popup spam 0.882 0.361
Ssh scan + TCP flood 0.882 0.028
DDoS UDP flood 0.923 0.077
DDoS TCP flood 0.887 0.027
DDoS UDP flood + traffic deletion 0.932 0.072
Table 7.1: Classification results by using WEKA’s SimpleCart classifier
into the data set. This confirms that the use of kernel functions for traffic profile evaluation
is valid, even if weak attacks could not be detected visually in a graph (see Figure 7.2).
The same conclusions hold for the phase space analysis. The true-positive rates were in
the region of 88% to 94% for the attacks. The false-positive rates were acceptable (2 —
20%), even if for one particular attack, the rate was more than 30%. In Chapter 4, the
false-positive rates were lower because unaggregated Netflow records were used as input
and compared in time windows, which is equivalent to computing pairwise distances for
approximately 22,000 flows per window. By inspecting the data set in more depth, it can be
observed that the size of traffic profiles is constant, giving an average size of 42 nodes. This
3http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka, last accessed: March 2011
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means that in the worst case, the DANAK method must compute 422 kernel functions to
compare the two traffic profiles. This is very low compared to the 22, 0002 operations needed
to compare two simple Netflow record windows. From the perspective of complexity, the
situation is the same as in Chapter 4, O(n2). Obviously, the aggregation process needs some
additional optimization, as proposed in [68, 20], especially for bounding the size of a tree
during its construction phase. By introducing tree-optimization, trees can be constructed
on the fly. In other words, aggregation is a good tradeoff for improving the scalability of the
presented approach by maintaining a high true-positive rate with only a low cost in terms
of false-positives.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, a spatial temporal aggregation method of Netflow records was applied to
phase space embedding in order to gain historical knowledge about traffic profiles. This
contribution was published in [143]. It shows the benefits of combining phase space analysis
with a kernel function to evaluate Netflow records, which is only possible if the records are
aggregated. Various attacks on a real data set were analyzed with this new monitoring model
to validate the approach. It was shown that applying only the kernel function to aggregated
Netflow records was insufficient for tracking some kinds of stealthy attacks. Therefore a new
technique phase space embedding was applied to the traffic profile kernel function values.
This enabled stealthy attacks to be detected by generating historical reconstructions of
traffic profiles. From the point of view of classification, it can be said that the method is
well-suited to the detection of most types of injected attacks, although, in some cases, the
false-positive rates are high.
As stated in the experimental results section, false-positives may be reduced by using
simple Netflow record windows without aggregation, this would result in impossibly high
run time costs (see section 7.2). Therefore, a trade-off must made: either the analysis can be
performed quickly, or false-positive rates can be minimized at the cost of very long runtimes.
Here, it is argued even if false-positive rates are a bit higher than for the Netflow record
window analysis, the method is able to catch most attacks. It is also advantageous from a
storage perspective, because one has to store on average just 52 lines for a profile, compared
with 22,000 lines for a Netflow record window.
A major problem in the analysis of spatio-temporal data is to find a good representation
for the data dynamics. The phase space embedding approach, allows reconstruction of
missing data from estimates, so building a historical profiles for traffic. A limitation in
this approach is that in the model presented only three successive profiles are used for the
reconstruction of missing dimensions, allowing insight into traffic dynamics over only a brief
period. Another limitation remains the calculation cost for the kernel function applied to
Netflow record profiles, which results in long runtimes.
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Part B:
Analysis of Tor network flows
using machine learning
Introduction
Anonymous communication systems have emerged as potential solutions to the challenges
of providing privacy and anonymous web access. The initial implementation of this kind of
network architecture was provided by state-funded system for the government [133] that en-
hanced confidential and privacy-conserving information transmission by implementing strong
security services.
Tor [32, 133, 19] is the best known overlay network approach, because it has a large
deployment base and provides good security services. Tor is based on onion routing, which
encrypts data and then randomly distributes information through a network of volunteer
nodes, known as relays. Onion routing [111] uses layered encryption, where each layer
represents a relay. This encrpytion scheme can be compared to the layers of an onion. The
source system encrypts multiple times, then sends it through the relays, where each relay
removes one layer of encryption before sending the data to the next relay, until it eventually
reaches its destination. The aim of Tor is to conserve the anonymity and privacy of the
communication as it passes through the relays.
A major drawback of such secured systems is that they are often abused for malicious
activity by hackers, paedophile rings or terrorists. A recent example is the terrorist attacks
in Norway on July 22, 2011. The author of these attacks, Anders Breivik urges potential
candidates to use Tor for communicating their activities, as shown in the following verbatim
extract from his doctrine, A European declaration of Independence4 published after the
attacks:
“ Use Tor network (while following all Tor guidelines) or use an equivalent service
which will mask your PC/IP identity when browsing the net. Alternatively, you can use an
anonymous PC from a LAN network provided by Mc Donalds or any available commercial
services as long as they do not require you do ID yourself...”.
This is only one example, showing that Tor networks provide a strong architecture for
hiding the identity and location of users that is unfortunately often misused with harmful
intentions.
The main idea behind this kind of system is an overlay network, which is used to mix
traffic and so defeat attacks based on traffic correlation analysis. Despite the strong security
services provided by Tor, some vulnerabilities were discovered in recent years. Several articles
[93, 19, 78, 99, 162, 10, 153, 154, 158] have shown Tor’s vulnerability to a class of disclosure
attacks which are able to detect whether one host is communicating with another. In most
research, the threat model assumes that a malicious entity can control either a Tor entry
node or a pair (entry and exit) of nodes.
4http://bundes.blog.de/2011/07/24/2083-european-declaration-of-independence\
\-manifest-behring-breivik-11534460/, last accessed, 27.09.2011
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In some cases, attackers inject data or tags into user-related flows in order to trigger
information disclosure [132]. Several protection mechanisms have been proposed, such as
probing exit nodes [134] or forging browser-related information.
This part of the thesis presents two contributions:
• A data mining driven solution to recover the browsing history of Tor users (in Chapter
8).
• Optimal configuration settings based on game theory for Tor users and Tor operators,
taking malicious nodes into account (in Chapter 9).
Following the discussion in [99], only trusted entry nodes should be selected when using
a Tor network. Therefore, in Chapter 8, Torinj, proof-of-concept malware (see Appendix D
and also [146, 149]) is proposed that attempts to infect trusted Tor nodes with the aim of
reconstructing overall network activity. The purpose of this part of the thesis is to detect
the number of distinct users and to reconstruct the browsing history for each user. Torinj,
targets Tor exit nodes because a larger vulnerable population of exit nodes than entry nodes
is expected and they are presumed to be more vulnerable than entry nodes. The main
puropse of Torinj is its ability to recover a user’s browsing history even when a trusted entry
node is used.
The disclosure of users’ identities or locations is not specifically addressed; rather, the
focus is on extracting user-specific behaviors. A practical attack that leverages a semi-
supervised learning algorithm and a simple traffic injection scheme for this purpose is de-
scribed. Several defensive measures exist, including enhancing user privacy by manipulating
user agent fields or by testing the exit node. These actions can be countered by an attacker
— he can become more stealthy in order to capture and reconstruct as many sessions as
possible. Chapter 9 tests the efficiency of these strategies with the aid of game-theoretical
concepts.
Chapter 8
Breaking Tor anonymity by flow
analysis through data mining
8.1 Introduction to data-mining a Tor session
It is challenging to reconstruct Tor sessions when only one exit node can be controlled.
The attacker can observe pairs of outgoing requests and incoming replies but is unable
to differentiate individual sessions. Thus, anonymous browsing under this threat model is
analogous to hiding in the crowd. Consequently, it is natural to attempt to isolate individual
browsing histories and build individual user-related trace histories. This chapter describes
a new attack that leverages a Data Mining technique together with aspects of the HTTP
protocol to cluster and extract individual HTTP sessions relayed over a malicious exit node.
In this analysis, only Web traffic is considered. The new attack scenario is represented in
Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Typical attack scenario
Several users (in the example, for the sake of clarity only two users are considered) use
two Tor entry nodes, which build tunnels ending at an exit node. It is assumed that this
exit node is controlled by an attacker, so he can observe the traffic (five flows) between the
exit node and the three servers. The objective of the attack is first to establish that only
two users (user A and user B) are currently routed through the exit nodes, and second to
reconstruct the browsing history for each of them. In this case, flowA1, flowA2 and flowA3
can be tagged as belonging to user A, while flowB1 and flowB2 are tagged for user B. The
practical attack on Tor is represented in Figure 8.2 and is executed as follows:
1. User A issues one (or several) HTTP request(s) to server 1. This traffic is contained
in one flow: flowA1. The malicious exit node forwards the request(s) to server 1
and injects a static tag. The static tag is a fixed image that is introduced in HTTP
responses. The image has a size of 1x1 pixel and is invisible, so as to avoid distracting
the user while browsing the HTML page. The image URL is unique for every injection.
This is done by generating a universally unique number that is used to name the image
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Figure 8.2: Injection attack Figure 8.3: Flow A2 interaction details
file. We assume that the browser cache on the user’s machine is working correctly and
that the image is downloaded only once. The file containing the image is hosted on an
attacker-controlled server, the tagging server. For illustration, we assume the server
URL to be www.taggingserver.com.
2. The browser of user A requests the tag by connecting to the tagging server to down-
load it. Even if another Tor exit node is used to retrieve the tag, the incoming traffic
(flowA2) is intercepted by the attacker. This step in the attack (see Figure 8.3) is essen-
tial to logically link flowA2 and flowA1. The attacker uses the image URL to link the
initial injection performed on the flow flowA1 with the incoming request. The tagging
server replies with a redirection URI www.taggingserver.com/static.png — which
is a static URL. This reply is provided via the 301 Moved Permanently HTTP response
code [39]. It will also set a unique cookie for the domain www.taggingserver.com if
no cookie was provided in the request.
The browser of user A will retrieve the file static.png and cache the new URI, which
is the same for all replies performed in this stage. The advantage of this redirection
is that, when an URI is retrieved via 301 Moved Permanently, its response codes are
locally cached by the browser. Setting the cookie depends on the browser’s capability
to accept third party cookies, but it can also work without setting the cookie, if
an additional synchronization step between the tagging server and the exit node is
performed. This step is needed to associate the flow used to download the image tag
with the initial request/response. Obviously, these cookies are not taken into account
when clustering the traffic. This injected traffic is not considered when assessing the
performance of the Data Mining algorithm.
3. User A issues one (or several) HTTP request(s) to server 2, contained in flowA3. The
malicious exit node forwards the request(s) to server 2 and performs a tag injection.
The tagging server replies with a redirection URI www.taggingserver.com/static.png.
In this redirection, no cookie is set for the domain www.taggingserver.com because
the request already includes the cookie received in the previous step. This reply is
provided via the 301 Moved Permanently HTTP response code. However, the browser
of user A will not retrieve the file static.png because it is already cached locally —
the user agent will use the locally-cached version instead. Due to the missing down-
load and the provided cookie, the attacker learns that the incoming traffic and the
associated flow flowA3, are related to a user that has already been observed.
4. User B issues one (or several) HTTP request(s) to server 1. This traffic is contained
in flowB1. The malicious exit node forwards the request(s) to server 1 and performs
a tag injection.
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5. The browser of user B requests the static tag by connecting to the tagging server
to download it. The incoming traffic (flowB2) is intercepted by the attacker. The
processing is similar to the previous case.
Here, a download of www.taggingserver.com/static.png is performed and no cookie
for the domain www.taggingserver.com is included, the attacker can infer that flowB1
and flowB2 are associated with a user that has not been observed yet.
6. Both users (A and B) continue their browsing sessions and will be tracked.
The key idea behind this attack is to have a set of flows for which it is definitely known
that the associated users are different: these are the flows targeted at the tagging server, from
which the 1x1 image is downloaded and the cookies are issued. Additionally, it is assumed
that connections by one user will share a set of features despite the Tor infrastructure [100].
Such features relate to user agent-specific settings (e.g. accepted language, version, name),
and to outgoing HTTP requests (cookies, destination URIs). Finally, it is presumed that
users follow a normal browsing behavior — i.e. after retrieving a HTML page, the next
connection will be targeted towards an URI which is included in the initial web page.
The problem that has to be solved is: A large amount of data must be clustered, where it
is certain that only a small subset belongs to each cluster. To solve this problem, a relevant
distance function defined over pairs of flows is calculated. This function considers content-
related similarities, user agent-specific settings and HTTP-specific protocol elements. A
semi-supervised clustering algorithm takes this distance into account when performing the
clustering.
8.2 The semi-supervised clustering algorithm
The methodology used to assign membership of flows to users is based on the idea of a semi-
supervised clustering algorithm, known as a label propagation algorithm [161] presented in
Chapter 3.5. We assume C different classes. Each class is initially represented by a flow that
was tapped at the tagging server. All labels are propagated iteratively to unlabelled regions.
At the end of the iterations, each unlabelled node is allocated to the most probable class —
see Figure 8.4. Initially, there are only a few flows for which the user is known. These are
the flows that have been used to retrieve the image file from the tagging server and where
cookies have been set. The aim is to classify the remaining flows by clustering them on a
per-user class basis. This is done by the clustering algorithm, which uses a distance function
between pairs of flows to compare them.
Figure 8.4: Semi-supervised learning algorithm
There is a set RD composed of labelled data (x1, y1),...,(xl, yl) and unlabelled data
(xl+1, yl+1),..., (xl+u, yl+u) with l * u, where YL={y1, ..., yl} are the class labels of the
labelled data and YU={yl+1, ..., yl+u} of those yet to be assigned. D is the dimension of the
input space. It is assumed that the number of classes C is known and that all classes are
represented in the labelled data samples [161].
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Let X={x1, ..., xl+u} be the different flows, and assume that each x is a D-dimensional
vector, that is xi ∈ RD. Now estimate the class labels of the unlabelled samples YU from
the data items X and their class labels YL.
The various distances used in this algorithm have to be defined. Assume two flow-class
tuples (xi, yi) and (xj , yj) which must be compared. yi or yj represent the respective class
labels and D = 3. To calculate the distances, the flow xi is decomposed into a set of
requests and responses, Flowi={(reqi1,repi1),...,(reqik, repik)}. The same is done for flow
xj , Flowj={(reqj1,repj1),...,(reqjl, repjl)}.
d(i, j) is the distance between the two pairs (reqip, repip) with p = (1 to n) and (reqjq, repjq)
with q = (1 to m).
dij = d(Flowi, F lowj) = d1(reqip, reqjq) + d2(reqip, repjq) + d2(reqjq, repip) (8.1)
where d1(reqip,reqjq) is the Levenshtein distance1 dL of particular parameters: the content
of Cookie (Co), URL, User agent (UA) and Accepted Languages (AL) fileds.
d1(reqip, reqjq) = dL
(
(reqip[Co], reqjq[Co]) + dL(reqip[URL], reqjq[URL])
+dL(reqip[UA], reqjq[UA]) + dL(reqip[AL], reqjq[AL])
) (8.2)
Equation 8.2 calculates the Levenshtein distance between the requests ip and jq, which
is the sum of the numerical distances of the fields listed above.
Distance d2(reqip, repjq) reflects whether or not a requested URL from ip is contained
in reply jp,
d2(reqip, repjq) =
{
α if reqip[URL] substring of reqjq
0 otherwise (8.3)
with α∈N, and in this case α=1. α can be selected in order to tune the algorithm and con-
siders the weight given to a logical link of browsing activity. The formula for d2(reqip, repjp)
can also be applied for distance d2(reqjq, repip), to see whether or not a requested URL from
jp is in reply ip.
The labelled and unlabelled data samples are represented in a fully-connected graph,
where the edge between nodes i, j is weighted. To calculate the edge weight wij , the
distances and estimated weights are scaled by σ, a function width scaling parameter.
wij = exp(−
d2ij
σ2
) = exp(−
∑D
d=1(x
d
i + xdj )2
σ2
) (8.4)
Node labels are propagated through the edges to all other nodes. As in [161], we define a
(l + u) × (l + u) transition matrix T , where Tij gives the probability of a transition from
node i to j.
Tij = P (i→ j) = wij∑l+u
k=1 wjk
(8.5)
(l + u) × C is defined as label matrix Y , where a row reflects the label probability
distribution of a node. For instance, the element Yic is the probability Yi of flow i belonging
to class c ∈ C. Initially these probabilities are initialized to 1/C for the unlabelled data
samples. The label propagation algorithm proposed by [161] has three steps,
• Propagate Y ← TY . All nodes propagate their labels.
• Row normalization of Y . This maintains a probability distribution.
• Clamping of labelled data. The label distribution of labelled data is clamped to Yic=1,
if item Yi had an initial label of c. This step assures that initial labels are maintained.
1Levenshtein distance [77]: Edit distance for measuring the difference between two strings or how many
operations are needed to change one string into another.
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These steps are repeated until Y converges. As proved in [161], the label propagation
algorithm always converges.
To evaluate the labeling algorithm, class sensitivity, class specificity and the number of
correct predictions, a technique set out in [8] is used. In a multi-class prediction problem
with C classes, a C × C contingency matrix Z=zij is used, where zij gives the number of
times a sample belonging to class i is put in class j.
Class sensitivity gives the value of correctly-predicted samples belonging to class i to
xi=
∑
jzij , the total number of samples associated with class i.
Qi =
zii
xi
(8.6)
Average class sensitivity φ scales the sensitivity for all classes according to the number of
classes C.
φ =
∑c
1Qi
C
(8.7)
Class specificity gives the ratio of correctly-predicted samples in class i to yi=
∑
j zji, the
total number of samples predicted to be in class i.
Qi =
zii
yi
(8.8)
Average class specificity ψ scales the specificity of all classes by the number of classes C.
ψ =
∑C
1 Qi
C
(8.9)
The final evaluation parameter is the quality QTotal, the value of all correct predictions
made.
QTotal =
∑
i zii
N
(8.10)
where N =
∑
ij zij =
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi.
8.3 Experimental results
8.3.1 Passive attacks
As a passive attack a Tor exit node was run for a period of 28 hours and captured HTTP
headers passively. Results similar to those reported in [85] were observed: 96% of traffic is
HTTP and only 4% of traffic is end-to-end encrypted with HTTPS. The injection attack
works only for HTTP replies that have the associated MIME [46] type set to text/html and
consequently the proportion in real traffic was measured. As shown in Table 8.1, about
30% of all HTTP replies have the MIME type set to text/html. Over this time frame, 627
reply messages were injected and 879 unique download requests from the tagging server were
observed. The exit node provided 2Mbit/s bandwidth and it was assumed that the attack
was undetected because the exit node did not get blacklisted.
8.3.2 The hidden exit node
The accuracy and precision of the implemented attack were assessed. To accomplish this, a
hidden exit node was installed and students in a class were asked to use it. Ten experiments
were performed with total control of the browsing history. Thus, it was exactly known
which URLs belonged to which user session and thus, it was possible to compare the results
obtained with the clustering algorithm with reality, as shown in Table 8.2. Additionally, the
impact of the tagging process was investigated. While tagging all HTTP requests having
the MIME type set to text/html is possible, an advanced attacker could be less invasive
and tag only a subset of the HTTP requests. For instance he could use a probabilistic
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General Information per Data set
Data set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Request 402 411 404 462 416 401 408 408 420 406
/Response pairs
User-Agents 11 10 10 8 12 11 12 7 6 4
Cookies 43 62 48 50 81 51 66 44 95 48
URLs 56 160 133 109 167 144 182 128 148 156
text/html 0.520 0.198 0.227 0.380 0.450 0.185 0.228 0.215 0.231 0.211
text/css 0.280 0.001 0.042 0.005 0.027 0.015 0.045 0.030 - 0.075
application 0.055 0.061 0.070 0.017 0.042 0.053 0.128 0.110 0.058 0.067
/x-javascript
application 0.045 0.005 0.022 - 0.022 - 0.032 0.038 0.010 0.052
/shockwave-flash
image/jpeg 0.031 0.670 0.601 0.413 0.381 0.555 0.463 0.545 0.564 0.491
/png/gif/x-icon
text/javascript 0.020 0.015 0.002 0.012 0.020 0.035 0.010 - 0.014 0.035
text/plain 0.018 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.091 0.022
application/xml 0.005 0.007 0.007 - - 0.010 0.005 0.013 0.002 0.012
text/xml 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.005
Miscellaneous 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.131 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.004
Content
Table 8.1: Global statistical information
Sensitivity, Specificity and Qtotal for 3 values of θ
Set (C) θ = 0.1 θ = 0.2 θ = 0.3
φ / ψ Qtotal N φ / ψ Qtotal N φ / ψ Qtotal N
1 (7) 0.47/0.52 0.80 357 0.53/0.82 0.89 306 0.62/0.82 0.88 285
2 (9) 0.35/0.49 0.65 357 0.45/0.71 0.71 320 0.54/0.72 0.74 285
3 (8) 0.47/0.54 0.54 358 0.52/0.75 0.64 323 0.55/0.75 0.68 275
4 (6) 0.45/0.54 0.64 364 0.48/0.54 0.69 332 0.52/0.55 0.78 273
5 (5) 0.55/0.66 0.72 357 0.60/0.70 0.81 315 0.71/0.79 0.84 290
6 (8) 0.54/0.53 0.85 352 0.52/0.60 0.87 314 0.56/0.73 0.88 289
7 (11) 0.31/0.59 0.61 362 0.33/0.69 0.70 308 0.42/0.69 0.71 270
8 (7) 0.32/0.49 0.63 349 0.31/0.51 0.72 317 0.41/0.51 0.76 259
9 (4) 0.49/0.63 0.73 371 0.45/0.92 0.70 313 0.58/0.95 0.81 271
10 (4) 0.51/0.69 0.82 360 0.64/0.69 0.82 302 0.69/0.72 0.92 269
Table 8.2: Sensitivity φ, Specificity ψ, Qtotal, the number of classes C and the number of
samples N for different thresholds θ
scheme driven by a threshold, i.e. for each HTTP reply, a random number between 0
and 1 was generated and if it is less than a predefined threshold then an HTML injection
was performed. Tagging was performed for three different threshold values, the injection
probabilities θ. The outcomes in Table 8.2 validate the clustering algorithm and represent
average results obtained by multiple simulation runs. It can be observed that 30% of the
HTTP responses contained HTML documents, so an attacker can set θ = 0.3 (σ = 1) as
maximal value, which gives the best prediction quality. The explanation for this is, that
more request/responses are known. To show the robustness of our method, the standard
deviation for the ten data sets is calculated and found to be very low, at 0.08.
8.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a new inference attack against anonymous communication sys-
tems that combines an active tag injection scheme with a Data Mining algorithm to cluster
observed traffic flows. The label propagation algorithm provides results with an accuracy of
92% for attributing a flow to a user. The overall aim of this chapter was to present a method
for identifying flows that are related to specific users and not to disclose a users identity.
A proof-of-concept application described in Appendix D was developed to implement the
attack.
Chapter 9
A game for attack and defence
strategies in Tor flow analysis
To enhance privacy, a user of a Tor network can deploy several defensive measures such as
modifying fields or testing the exit node. Knowing about such measures, an attacker can
avoid them by being more stealthy in order to capture and reconstruct as many sessions as
possible. In this chapter, the efficiency of these defensive/attacking strategies is investigated
with the aid of a game-theoretical concept, called Nash Equilibrium.
9.1 Defence and attack strategies
A Tor user can deploy two main types of defensive measure to counter an injection attack.
These can detect the malicious node and denounce it as a rogue in the global Tor directory.
To do this, a user connects to a known web server and retrieves a particular web page. A
hash function checks whether the reply has been tampered with. A previously-stored hash
value is compared with the current one and, if a mismatch is detected, then the injection is
revealed. This idea is proposed in [103] in the wider context of security improvements for
the Tor network. Another proposal consists in carefully distributing Tor exit node usage so
as to use disjoint IP networks. The latter proposal is not considered in the current game.
Regarding the case of bad Tor exit nodes, Torscanner [134] is in use. The current process
for adding a BadExit flag is implemented by the authorities managing the Tor directories,
but at the time of writing, no router marked with a BadExit flag has been found.
Once a rogue node has been announced, no other user will use it as an exit node and thus,
for an attacker the game is literally over. The attacker can however minimize the probability
of being detected by performing fewer injections to improve his stealth, e.g. instead of
injecting the image tag into all HTTP replies, the attacker can use a probabilistic scheme
and tag only a subset, like injecting only into 10 to 50% of the replies. The presumption is
that the probability of being detected is indirectly proportional to injection probability.
Another set of measures directly attacks the data mining approach presented in Chapter
8. Users can manipulate the HTTP headers that disclose information about their browser.
For example, the user agent field can be spoofed or completely removed. Privoxy [107] allows
the specification of a list of user agents that can be used for this purpose. Another header
that can be changed or removed is the accepted languages, but impractical to provide a
completely random choice, since popular web sites use this field to provide customized
content/layout. For example, English-speaking users almost never access Google’s russian
website, except in order to remain anonymous.
The game between an attacker and Tor users is modelled by using the Nash Equilibrium
notations from Chapter 6 which are set out in [53].
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A game for Tor user and attacker be defined as a 3-tuple Γ = (N, (Ai, Ri)1≤i≤n), where
N is a set of n players, Ai a finite strategy set (ai ∈ An) and Ri: A→R a payoff function,
where A = A1×...×An. The game has two players, N={Tor user, attacker}. All Tor users
act as a single collective player. The set A1 corresponds to the Tor user actions and A2 to the
attacker’s actions. The Tor user strategy is defined as a set of actions A1 = {a1,0, ..., a1,3},
where
a1,0 : Every user works normally — the web client is used without any privacy protection
mechanisms
a1,1 : Everybody modifies the user agent — for each request, a user agent is randomly
selected and spoofed in the requests
a1,2 : Everybody deletes user agent — no information whatever is leaked to the attacker
a1,3 : Everybody deletes accepted languages — no language-specific information is leaked
The attacker strategy is defined as a set of vectors A2={(a2,θ)} where θ={0.1,0.2, ...,0.5} is
the injection probability. An attacker plays by choosing the probability of injecting a frame
into a given HTTP reply.
A Nash equilibrium in the context of a Tor system game means that neither the Tor user
nor the attacker can increase their expected payoffs, assuming that neither player changes
his strategy during the game.
Computing payoffs
The payoff for each player should model his gain as accurately as possible. Two distinct
goals are important for an attacker. First, he should reconstruct sessions as accurately as
possible by maximizing QTotal. Secondly, he should remain as stealthy as possible and thus
perform as little tagging as possible.
In the previous paragraphs, it was explained that the more an attacker injects tags, the
higher the probability of being detected. The payoff function for the attacker, pa, can be
defined as pa = (1−θ)×QTotal. For the Tor user, the payoff pu is a measure of the achieved
privacy and can be defined as pu = (1−QTotal).
9.1.1 Advanced attacks
When a Tor user deploys a user agent-changing strategy, the impact on clustering is im-
mediate. Due to the user agent field, the distance component will be biased and members
belonging to the same class will be missclassified as a result of large distances. Thus, for
an attacker, it makes sense to learn the list of user agents used by an individual user. This
would bias the distance function towards weighting out large differences in the user agent
field.
There is a straightforward extension that an attacker can implement, leveraging the
processing of HTTP error messages. According to the HTTP specification [39], a server
can reply with a HTTP Error 302 - Moved temporarily error message, which includes an
alternative URL to which redirection should occur. The web browser immediately retries
the alternative URL. If this happens, the user agent supplied by a user who is spoofing this
field will change.
The attacker can use this behaviour to discover the list of user agents in use by a user. As
the basic attack, an image tag (i.e. www.taggingserver.com/uuid.jpg) is injected into a re-
ply that is being relayed by the exit node. The user’s browser does not have the image in the
cache and will connect to the tagging server to retrieve it. To achieve this, the client spoofs
the user agent header by using one of the values from its list. The tagging server receives a
request for the resource uuid.jpg. Instead of sending back the corresponding file, the server
will generate a universally unique identifier uuid1, reply with a HTTP Error 302 Moved tem-
porarily message and provide the alternative URL: www.taggingserver.com/uuid1.jpg.
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Figure 9.1: Tagging server attack with HTTP error message
Consequently, the client will contact the tagging server www.taggingserver.com and
ask for uuid1.jpg. For this request, another value for the user agent list is used and hence
disclosed. The tagging server replies with one more HTTP Error 302 Moved temporarily
error and an additional alternative URL: www.taggingserver.com/uuid2.jpg. Browsers
allow this process to be repeated up to five times. The fifth request can be answered
by sending back the image file. The use of a universally-unique identifier is required to
differentiate user-initiated requests. Obviously the file uuidx.jpg must not actually exist and
x is used by the tagging server to count the HTTP Error 302 Moved temporarily messages
that have already been sent back.
To differentiate between new users and users who have already been observed, the final
download of the image file and a cookie-tracking mechanism is required. New users will
download the file and will have a cookie set, while previously observed users will rely on the
locally-cached data and will use the domain cookie in all requests, as represented in Figure
9.1.
When the procedure is complete, the attacker has learned five values used to spoof the
user agent header. Large lists can be retrieved by generalizing the attack and having more
than one tag injection. Starting with the first request, n different image tags are injected. If
these are not cached, the client will retrieve them from the tagging server. Each individual
request will reveal one value used to scrub the user agent field. For each individual image
tag up to five alternative URLs will be provided and thus disclose a total of 5n user agent
values.
9.2 Experimental Results
9.2.1 Defence strategies: playing Tor games
The game theoretical model was applied to data set 7 and the Nash equilibrium was com-
puted using the Gambit library [136]. As the clustering values of QTotal are not constant,
this step was repeated three times and the average value taken. Table 9.1 shows the aver-
age payoff values for experiments with data set number 7. An Equilibrium with two pure
strategies was obtained and is represented in Table 9.2.
A pure strategy in the context of Tor security is defined as the set of actions providing
a complete definition of a user’s strategy, allowing the prediction of moves a player can
make in any situation. This result shows that under game assumptions, the best strategy
is to randomly change the user agent. This is unexpected, since a different outcome was
anticipated. It had seemed far better to delete the user agent field and thus provide no
information at all. It can be deduced that the random spoofing of user agents adds more
noise and so disrupts the clustering process.
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Payoff values for attacker pa and user pu
θ a1,0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3
pu pa pu pa pu pa pu pa
0.1 0.42 0.52 0.77 0.20 0.42 0.53 0.45 0.45
0.2 0.36 0.51 0.70 0.24 0.32 0.55 0.32 0.54
0.3 0.23 0.54 0.65 0.24 0.29 0.5 0.27 0.51
0.4 0.30 0.42 0.62 0.23 0.26 0.45 0.22 0.47
0.5 0.23 0.38 0.53 0.22 0.23 0.39 0.26 0.37
Table 9.1: Payoffs for attacker pa and Tor user pu
Nb Attacker Tor User
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 a1,0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Table 9.2: Nash Equilibrium table
In the light of this unexpected outcome, the impact of changing the user agent list for
an end-user population was studied. In data set 7, the proportion of users changing their
user agent is varied. A list of eleven user agents was used. The changing of the user agent
was implemented by randomly choosing one value on a per-request basis. A simulation of
a strategy using real data by directly changing the user agent field in the raw data with
θ = 0.3 (σ = 1) was run. It was observed that the accuracy was strongly impacted when
all users changed their user agent, resulting in a loss in classification quality (Qtotal), as
presented in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2: Users changing User Agent
To deepen the analysis, a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) method was introduced in
order to show what happened if players made bad moves. The reader is referred to Chapter
6.4 for a description of the QRE approach. The QRE analysis was performed in order to
show the effectiveness of the players’ various strategies, because it can provide quite different
results as the Nash Equilibrium analysis.
Figure 9.3 shows the results of the evaluation. Setting λ = 0 gives an equal distribution
for the different strategies: there is an initial probability of 0.2 for all five strategies. By
increasing λ we observe that the behaviour of the curves tends towards the previously
obtained Nash Equilibrium (as presented in Table 9.2) and stabilizes.
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Figure 9.3: Quantal response equilibrium evaluation
This result confirms the results already obtained with the simple Nash Equilibrium,
namely that the best strategy for an attacker is to use a tagging probability of 0.3, whereas
the best strategy for a user is to apply strategy a1,1, where every user modifies his user
agent.
9.3 Summary
This chapter has modelled a game for attacker and Tor user in order to discover which
strategies perform the best. This work has previously been presented in [146, 149]. Several
possible attack and defence strategies were described in order to make the Nash stategies
more comprehensible. To strengthen the evaluation, the quantal response equilibrium ap-
proach, a more advanced method was applied. This showed was shown that the results
obtained confirm the Nash Equilibrum outcome.
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Conclusions and Future Work
The first part of this thesis described different models and their related proof-of-concepts for
the analysis of Netflow records on attacks and anomalies. Netflow records provide valuable
information not only about traffic content, but also about the communicating partners.
Netflow records also provide insights into attack attempts, because particular Netflow record
patterns appear in the Netflow record history: for example a very large number of logs for
the same host differing only in their port numbers.
From an ISP perspective, Netflow records are the only available information, since it
is impossible to store full packet captures of data. Compact formats for Netflow records
are commonly used, for example by applying aggregation of Netflow records as described
in this thesis. In this tree-like aggregation process, small Netflow records are aggregated
into larger ones, such that they gain in relevancy and so can represent larger entities, for
example subnets. A major advantage of this aggregation process is that data per se is not
simply lost, but added to a larger entity.
The initial approach in this thesis dealt with the analysis of Netflow record windows and
required storage of all Netflow records. The results obtained by applying a kernel function
for exploring Netflow record content to machine learning showed that this approach is very
useful in the detection of anomalies. There is a considerable body of work describing the
use of to machine learning techniques for the evaluation of network data but, unlike the
work described in this thesis, these machine learning approaches are used without a special
shaping of network data.
A major problem with this approach is that in practical applications, this method is not
feasible, since the storage of all Netflow records is not possible for a network operator. A
further limitation of this approach is that all Netflow records of a Netflow record window
(each of an average size of 22,000 lines) must be compared to each other, making the cal-
culation of the kernel function between Netflow record windows was a very time-consuming
task.
This showed the need to introduce a more concise model for the storage of Netflow
records. A possible method would have been to use sampling methods presented in Chapter
3.1; another possibility was to apply aggregation (see Chapter 3.2), where Netflow records
are aggregated over space and time into tree-like structures. Netflow record profiles can be
analyzed for anomalies by combining the kernel function with a machine learning approach,
which classifies them into benign and unusual traffic. By applying the kernel function to the
traffic profile, a major outcome is that strong attacks can be identified simply by using the
kernel function without additional processing methods.
To illustrate the effectiveness of this approach, a prototype was implemented that vi-
sualizes the outcomes for the kernel function values, allowing service injection or stealthy
attacks to be easily represented in image form (see Appendix C).
An advantage and at the same time a limitation of the experimental analysis is that
the data set was extended by injecting synthetic traffic traces, rather than using traces from
known real-world attacks. On the other hand this allowed accurate analysis, as it was known
exactly where the attacks were located. To extend this work, attack and defence strategies
for attacker and network operator respectively were identified and explored by applying a
game-theoretical model to the aggregated Netflow records.
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A major limitation of the machine learning approach is false-positive rates which vary
considerably for the attack models, with stealthy attacks showing higher false-positive rates
than scanning attacks for example.
The outcomes of the previous contributions showed that the kernel function for ag-
gregated Netflow records is not able to track stealthy attacks accurately. Another major
drawback of Netflow records is that sometimes, due to technical problems, Netflow record
time windows are lost or not recorded. These two arguments motivated the development of
a new technique that is able to detect stealthier attacks and identify attacks in sparse data
sets, through a reconstruction of missing dimensions in traffic profile histories. By applying
the method of phase space embedding, missing profiles in a time series can be reconstructed
by estimation.
Part B describes the analysis of application flows in order to associate flows to users.
This part describes a new inference attack against anonymous communication systems that
combines an active tag injection scheme with a semi-supervised data mining algorithm to
cluster observed traffic flows. Each cluster corresponds to the browsing history of one user.
The performance of this attack was assessed on several realistic data sets and a formal
modelling framework based on game-theoretical concepts is proposed.
More advanced attack and defence strategies were evaluated with this framework and an
optimal set of strategies was identified (in the context of the Nash equilibrium). The aim of
this approach was not to reveal the user location or identity, but this could be achieved in
future work by going beyond simple HTML injection through injecting malicious JavaScript,
like Beef [55] or XSSProxy. This would build permanent connections (for the lifetime of a
browsing session) and allow advanced recognition actions against users’ privacy.
The approach presented has some limits. If all users use end-to-end encryption such as
ssl, this method is not able to correlate pairs of requests and replies to reconstruct browsing
histories. However, based on our experiments, less than 3% of all traffic is encrypted.
Another limitation of this method results from the maximum life-time of an established Tor
tunnel, which currently defaults to ten minutes.
The described attack is particularly suited for Web browsing reconstructions and it was
observed that. User agent-specific headers and HTTP parameters drive the clustering phase.
Several browser plugins already block image tags. PithHelmet1, an optional ad-blocker
for Safari2 includes this option and also blocks images matching a (fixed) list of common
banner ad sizes, e.g. 1x1 pixel. It blocks them by displaying a transparent graphic of the
same size after first downloading them, in order to define the image size, so our attack still
works. ICab3 mobile, a little-known third-party browser for iOS devices has a user-editable
list of sizes to block.
But again, even if 1x1 images are blocked, they have to be downloaded first. The more
general ad-block functionality, by Adblock Plus4 for FireFox, simply does not download
content from URLs matching any of a list of patterns. This offers no protection against the
attack presented in this thesis unless the image-hosting site gets blacklisted.
Future Work
This section presents some possible future research directions. This thesis has presented, a
variety of approaches to aspects on Netflow record analysis by introducing a kernel function
that is able to capture changes in network traffic. Netflow record windows as well as aggre-
gated forms of Netflow records have been analyzed for anomalies. Since the results obtained
by the kernel function after applying aggregation provided good results, a possible topic
for future work would be to optimize the aggregation process by estimating the optimal
thresholds for aggregation.
1http://www.culater.net/software/PithHelmet/PithHelmetSampleAdBlocking.php
2http://www.apple.com/safari/
3http://www.icab.de/
4http://adblockplus.org/en/
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By optimizing this process, long term analysis could be performed such that larger data
sets can be used for evaluation. Introducing additional features in future work could make
the approach more scalable, allowing analysis of traffic from ISPs and other institutions to
validate the presented approach on different kinds of traffic, since for example ISP traffic
cannot be compared to internal enterprise network activity.
Additionally some short term future work can be identified, aiming mainly to identify
evaluation techniques similar to the method presented. The evaluation of processed Netflow
records has mainly applied machine learning techniques, in particular classification mecha-
nisms, such as support vector machines. Future work could investigate alternative machine
learning approaches including semi-supervised learning like presented in the chapter con-
cerned with the evaluation of Tor data. Another activity could be to implement a kernel
function for Netflow records into a support vector machine algorithm, so reducing the overall
processing time. A possible method could be to adjust the support vector kernel such that
it is able to extract topological and quantitative information from Netflow records.
Relevant future work can be done in the area of the game-theoretical models since the
model presented here, does not learn during games. The work could develop new game-
theoretical models that leverage machine learning techniques for the generation of repeated
interactions between an attacker and a defence system.
From a computational perspective, the approaches presented need long runtimes and
show high complexities. These complexities could be reduced by optimizing the algorithms
for the kernel calculus. An alternative or additional mean of reducing runtime would be to
apply distributed computing techniques, for example Hadoop5. These split large computing
tasks into smaller tasks and distribute them over many machines. This improves runtime,
so speeding the processing of large data sets.
A possible extension of this work would be to include analysis and cross-analysis with
a variety of types of network-level data. Another extension would be to combine Netflow
records with DNS entries. DNS data provides relevant information about data on the wire.
The captured data can be evaluated by combining the presented approaches with DNS data
to identify attacks on a network, ranging from the detection of worms to fast-flux6 DNS
attacks. This would require fast, high-capacity storage as both DNS data and Netflow
records would need to be stored.
An interesting future work topic would be to extend the work on the Tor network to
count Tor users . This is particularly difficult, since exit nodes have major differences in
terms of bandwidth, service policies and location. A further challenge is to extend the Tor
approach to the more general case of any application using anonymous overlay networks
5http://hadoop.apache.org/
6Fast-flux DNS [29, 155]: a commonly used botnet DNS approach for hiding malicious sites behind
compromised hosts acting as proxies.
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Appendix A
Data sets
This section describes the different data sets that were used for performing the experiments
described in this thesis. A major problem for the validation of the approaches presented
was to find a labelled data set. Many previous works have used the Lincoln data set 1, but
nowadays this is considered outdated. Therefore the work presented here is based on three
data sets, the first two provided by a large network operator in Luxembourg and the third
from a legitimate honeypot. The ISP data set is assumed to be free from malicious network
traffic as a secondary semi-automated traffic screening has been performed with aid of a
network operator specific-solution [95].
A.1 Simple Netflow Analysis
The following table summarizes the data set from Luxembourg ISP operator. This data
set was used to perform the experiments of unaggregated Netflow records in Chapter 4.4.2.
Additionally, this data set was extended later by injecting attacks with Flame (see appendix
B.2). To this extend, this data set was then used to generate aggregated Netflow records
profiles in Chapter 7.2.
Flows 1,371,194
IP addresses 128,781 (source), 125,723 (destination)
Duration 13min 31sec
Bytes 7.5GB
Avg. bytes/flow 5,492
Packets 11.5M
Avg. packets/flow 8.36
UDP Flows 983,511
TCP Flows 375,132
ICMP Flows 11,347
Other protocols Flows 1,204
Table A.1: ISP data set statistics
1http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/communications/ist/corpora/ideval/data/index.html, last ac-
cessed: March 2011
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A.2 Aggregation-based evaluation of Netflow records
The following table shows a second data set records from an ISP operator. This data set
includes aggregated Netflow records, and was used to validate the experiments in Chapter
6.3.
ISP data set
Average number of nodes 42
Number of flows 3,733,680
Total bytes 19.36G
Global capture duration 300 s
Average bandwidth 528Mbit/s
Table A.2: ISP network monitoring data set description
A High interaction honeypot, exposing a vulnerable ssh-server, was operated for 24 hours
on one public IP-address. All traffic related to this host was recorded and considered suspi-
cious by definition. The follwoing data set was used for the validation of the PeekKernelflows
tool, see Appendix C.
Honeypot data set
Number of addresses 47,523
Exchanged TCP packets 1,183,419
Operation time 24 hrs
Bandwidth used 64 Kbits/s
Colour (bit) 24
Table A.3: Honeypot monitoring data set description
Appendix B
The FLAME [12] attack
injection tool
B.1 General description
Figure B.1: Data set generation using Flame
The data sets used in the experiments are extended by injecting synthetic attack traces
into real traces using the Flame tool [12]. Written in C++, Flame is a tool for evaluating
anomalies at the flow level. Flame is based on Netflow records and takes Netflow record files
without malicious activity as input (flow reader in Figure B.1), then injects synthetic attacks
by generating (flow generator) or deleting (flow deleter) flow records based on various attack
models.
The main idea is that attacks will generate traffic, but also affect normal traffic through
activities such as DDoS. New attack records are combined with the modified input stream
by the flow merger to produce an output file. Figure B.1 shows this process.
A key task in Flame is the generation of the attack models for the simulation of attacks.
The default attack models, which were derived from real observations, are described on the
Flame website1. In an initial trial, the existing attack models were used to generate attacks
and later on, the experiments were extended by the creation of better adapted and stealthier
attacks.
1http://flame.ee.ethz.ch/publications.html
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B.2 Attack data set description
This table (B.1) shows the attack models that were used for the validation of the monitoring
approaches presented in this thesis. It presents both the default and newly generated attack
models generated using Flame. These attack models were applied to the data set A.1 to
perform the experiments in Chapter 4.4.2 and 7.2. The attack models annotated with a *
are integrated in Flame.
Nachi scan* The Nachi/Welchia worm was released in 2003. It tests the reachability of hosts using an
ICMP scan, which is considered in the attack model. One host of the original data set
sends single ICMP packets of 92 bytes to destination IP addresses defined by the following
properties: an IP address shift of between 40 — 45 between consecutive scans, a positive
or negative shift of 400 every 200 scans and a shift between 45 — 110 every 800 flows. The
inter-arrival time of flows is generally around 2 milliseconds but there is a break of around
61 milliseconds after 5 scans
NetBIOS
scan*
This is a traditional scan for finding vulnerabilities. The corresponding UDP flows con-
tain a single packet to port 137, with an inter-arrival time generally between 60 and 70
milliseconds. The destination hosts are scanned sequentially while sometimes keeping one
IP address. After, between 100 and 200 scans there is a shift in the destination IP address
of between 60 and 70
DDoS UDP
flood*
A host receives UDP packets on several ports and also sends from multiple IP addresses
with various ports. The attack generates a burst of 40 flows followed by a break of between
60 and 120 milliseconds
DDoS TCP
flood*
This denial-of-service attack targets web servers running on TCP port 80 with 3 packets of
128 bytes. A burst of 10 packets is sent before a break of between 60 and 120 milliseconds
Stealthy
DDoS UDP
flood:
Normal UDP flood, having more randomness in flow characteristics (number of packets,
size, duration) is applied, while the inter-arrival time can reach 1 second, representing a
very stealthy flooding attack, the attack modelled is more generic in order to improve the
completeness of the tests
DDoS UDP
flood + traffic
deletion
This is equivalent to the DDoS UDP flood, but each additional flow originated by the
victim has a probability of 0.2 of being deleted due to victim overload
Popup spam* This kind of spam is similar to the sending of undesired Windows Messenger popups by
using UDP port, 1026 and 1027. Only one packet of 925 bytes is needed. The victim IP
addresses do not show a regular pattern because two consecutive IP addresses have a gap
of 200 addresses. The inter-arrival time is generally lower than 1 millisecond, except that
every 200 flows, it is around 64 milliseconds, and every 550 it is 250 milliseconds
Ssh scan +
TCP flood
The goal of TCP scan is to probe an ssh server by trying to log in. This is by far the most
popular attack that occur in the wild. Each flow contains between 1 and 4 packets. The
inter-arrival time oscillates between 1 to 50 milliseconds. The destination IP addresses are
scanned in a sequential manner until approximately 400 scans have been executed. There
is then a shift of between 200 — 400 IP addresses. In order to test the approach in a real
scenario, 5% of the attacks are considered successful and the corresponding victims trigger
a TCP flood attack
Table B.1: Attack models generated with Flame
Appendix C
PeekKernelFlows — A
visualization method for
aggregated Netflow records
C.1 Visualizing aggregated Netflow records
The purpose of the PeekKernelFlows tool is to simplify the detection of anomalies on the
network by representing network activity in an intuitive colour scheme. Its main focus is on
scanning activities and dominant (e.g. ssh-brute force attack) or long-lasting TCP sessions
on the network. An additional feature is that it provides insights into the traffic of a single
host. Figure C.1 shows the architecture of PeekKernelFlows. The tool’s input is aggregated
Netflow records(see section 5.1), which are processed with the kernel function scheme (see
section 5.2.1).
Figure C.1: The PeekKernelFlows monitoring framework
The main task is the mapping of a kernel function value Ksrc,dst(Tn, Tn+1) onto an RGB
[27] colour scheme image.
When traffic fluctuations are large, the similarity between two profiles is quite low,
resulting in bits having a low value representation by black. Small profile similarities (Ki)
are displayed in bluish colours and high similarities in reddish colours. When all bits are
high (implying a very high similarity) the colour tends to white. The colour scheme is given
in Figure C.2.
!"#$%#&'!"#$%()'
Figure C.2: Colour representation of PeekKernelFlows
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C.2 The visual representation of PeekKernelFlows
Various parameters can be adjusted by the network operator, for example the monitoring
time for aggregated Netflow record profiles (η), the Brightness (B) or the Intensity factor
(I). As well as generating a graphical representation, PeekKernelFlows allows statistical
information to be retrieved in text-form.
!"
#"
!"
#"
Figure C.3: Figure for source (left) and destination (right) profiles
The sample display of Figure C.3 shows the output generated for the data set from a
honeypot, see Appendix A.3. The sample display in Figure C.3 has a resolution of 1,200 ×
1,000 pixels and holds 4,000 aggregated Netflow record profiles, the equivalent of four hours
monitoring. Relevant patterns can be observed. The three successive green lines on the left
frame, annotated by 1, represent ssh brute-force attacks. At the bottom of the source profile
representation a coloured line, annotated by 2, can interpreted as the scanning activities of
a legitimate honeypot against other hosts. Attackers used nearly the full bandwidth for
scanning entire sub-networks. These activities can be observed because they continue over
a longer time period.
The destination image gives a more fine-grainedinsight into attacker targets. The same
patterns as for the source profile, annotated by 3 and 4 respectively can be observed, rep-
resenting the communication intensity of both parties. Different patterns as the coloured
segments (4) represent the durations that the attackers stay at a single target, and the
amount of exchanged traffic. An observation is that dominant TCP sessions, such as ssh
brute-force attacks, are shown by bright colours, whereas scanning activities result in dark
colours. This can be explained by the kernel function, which plays a dominant topological
role in the volume/traffic matching function part.
Appendix D
The proof-of-concept Torinj
architecture
A proof of concept malware called Torinj was implemented. As shown in Figure D.1, the tool
is composed of three main components: a unmodified Tor client [133], an embedded inter-
cepting proxy, and a hidden C&C (command and control) channel. A standard, unmodified
Tor client is integrated into Torinj, providing access to the Tor network layer. Torinj behaves
like any other Tor client and provides similar services, including relay or exit functions. It
includes a small HTTP proxy used to intercept and relay HTTP requests. Interception and
relaying are activated by the attacker using the hidden C&C channel, which relies on the
hidden service protocol [108] available in Tor to provide some anonymity [99] to the C&C
interface and its user. The attacker accesses the C&C channel of each Torinj bot through
the Tor network. For testing we used three machines.
The first machine, M1, ran an unmodified Tor exit node (v0.2.1.14-rc). M2 ran BIND
[64] (v.9.4.2), as DNS server with tcpdump [131] to capture all DNS queries and responses.
M3 had an Apache [44] web server (v.2.2.6), hosting the transparent file image simulating
a malicious payload. Due to legal and ethical considerations, the proof-of-concept did not
inject malicious JavaScript payloads like XSS-proxy1 or BEEF [17]. The machines were
synchronized with NTP [88] to ensure precise timestamps. Connected to the Tor network,
we set up a web proxy implemented in Perl2(v.0.23) and extended it to inject tags. Iptables3
was set up to reroute traffic originated from the Tor exit node to the Perl proxy server via
the Internet. The web proxy was used to generate tags.
1XSS- proxy: http://sourceforge.net/projects/xss-proxy/
2Perl HTTP proxy-module: http://search.cpan.org/dist/HTTP-Proxy/
3http://www.iptables.org/
Figure D.1: An overview of the Torinj framework
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Appendix E
Glossary
AL: Accepted language
CART: Classsification and Regression Trees
Co: Cookie
DANAK:DetectingAnomalies inNetflow records by spatialAggregation andKernel
methods
DNS: Domain Name System
(D)DOS: (Distributed) Denial-of-Service
FTP: File Transfer Protocol
Honeypot: A monitored computer or system that aims to attract intruders to attack
or compromise the system
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS: Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
IP: Internet Protocol
IPFIX: IP Flow Information Export
ISP: Internet Service Provider
IT: Internet Technology
Malware: Malicious standalone software or embedded code in legitimate applications
ML: Machine Learning
NTP: Network Time Protocol
P2P: Peer-to-Peer
QRE: Quantal Response Equilibrium
RGB: Color space based on red, green and blue
Scanning: Explore network on active hosts
Spam or spam email: Unsolicited bulk mail
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SVM: Support Vector Machine
Tor network: Onion routing based network for anonymous communication
TDG: Traffic Dispersion Graph
UA: User Agent
URI: Uniform Resource Identifier
URL: Uniform Resource Locator
Worm: Self-replicating program that propagates through the network, e.g. by means
of mass mailing
0-day exploit: A security vulnerability that is exploited on the same day it is dis-
closed. 0-day, since there are 0 days between attack and detection.
0-sum game: A case in which the gain/loss of a player is dependent of the losses/gains
of other players. By adding up the all gains and subtracting all losses the sum will be
zero.
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